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Abstract
This thesis first examines the underlying theories of the statutory models of Nigerian and
Canadian company law, in order to determine the impact of these differing models on
minority shareholders’ protection in each jurisdiction. From a practical perspective, this
thesis then undertakes a comparative analysis of minority shareholders’ protections in the
respective corporate statutes along with the judicial interpretations provided by the
Nigerian and Canadian courts, with particular reference to the derivative action and
oppression remedy. The similarities and differences between the derivative action and
oppression remedy action available in each jurisdiction are highlighted, thereby revealing
certain areas of convergence and other areas of jurisdictional uniqueness.
Minority shareholders may be more willing to invest in jurisdictions where their status as
minority shareholders will not place them in a precarious situation. Consequently, this
thesis examines the extent to which minority shareholders’ protection can influence
dispersed investments in a developing economy like Nigeria. Concluding that there is a
plausible link between minority shareholders’ protection and dispersed investments, this
thesis recommends more adequate provisions and mechanisms to protect minority
shareholders so as to improve the extent of investments especially in a developing country
like Nigeria.

Keywords: corporation, company, majority rule, corporate legal personality, derivative
action, oppression remedy, shareholder, complainant, applicant.
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Lay Summary
This thesis conducts a comparative analysis of minority shareholders' protection available
under Nigerian and Canadian corporate law. It specifically addresses the statutory
provisions provided to remedy wrongs done to the corporations and to individual
shareholders under both jurisdictions. It argues that although the Canadian and Nigerian
corporate law evolved majorly from the English Acts, the Canadian statutory provisions
and interpretations provided by the Canadian courts have evolved to a higher level of
sophistication by providing more detail and flexibility that gives more adequate protection
for shareholders compared to the Nigerian corporate legal system. It also highlights the
different enforcement patterns in Nigeria that may negatively impact minority shareholders
in Nigerian corporations.
This thesis further draws the link between minority shareholders' protection and dispersed
investments and argues that strong minority shareholders' protection facilitates dispersed
investments which could help in economic development. Therefore, this thesis
recommends more adequate provisions and mechanisms to protect minority shareholders
so as to improve the extent of investments especially in a developing country like Nigeria.
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INTRODUCTION

Democratic principles1 have become entrenched in many institutions across the world and
the corporate environment is not an exception. These democratic principles have been
embedded into the corporate environment in most jurisdictions through the principle of
“majority rule”. 2

Further to these democratic principles, corporations are ordinarily

governed in accordance with the will of the majority shareholders of the company or of the
majority of members of the board of directors as the case may be. 3 Although democracy in
politics, i.e. one person- one vote and representatives elected by majority vote, is still not
a perfect system, it is one of the least problematic and most preferred modes of
governance. 4 However, when one transplants the ideals of democracy into the corporate
environment, unfortunately, it takes on a different hue.

The sacrosanct one person, one vote principle does not ordinarily apply in a corporate
environment. What applies in most instances where a decision is to be taken by the
shareholders is a voting system dependent on the number of shares an individual or
organization owns,5i.e. one share one vote. It is not uncommon to see situations where the
majority of the votes are concentrated in the hands of a few shareholders. In such situations,
the few shareholders, though they do not constitute the “majority” in number, nevertheless
may be the dominant shareholders based on the number of shares they hold in the
corporation. This creates an interesting paradox as the physical majority could be the

1

Democratic principles prescribe that decision-making is undertaken by the majority of persons in any given
group.
2
Majority rule is also known as the principle of shareholder democracy. This rule was established in Foss v
Harbottle [1843] 67 ER 189, which provides that where a wrong is done to a corporation, the proper plaintiff
is the corporation itself, and where such wrong can be ratified by the majority of shareholders in a general
meeting, the court will not interfere.
3
Generally, all powers of a company are to be exercised by one or other of its own organs: the shareholders
in the general meetings or the board of directors.
4
Larry Diamond, “The Democratic Rollback – The Resurgence of the Predatory State” (2008) 87:2 Foreign
Aff. 39 at 41.
5
Cumulative voting may be used in arriving at certain decisions. See Section 107 of the Canada Business
Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c. C-44 and Section 224 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, Laws of the
Federation of Nigeria, 2004.
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minority shareholders while the physical minority could be the dominant shareholders in a
company - the very antithesis of political democracy.6
While this situation itself is not an absurdity, where for instance both the objectives of the
holders of the majority and minority shares in the company are aligned, completely
different dynamics are manifest when there is a misalignment of objectives between these
shareholders, particularly in situations where the dominant shareholders are acting in their
own interests but not necessarily in the best interests of the company. It even becomes more
complicated where an alleged wrong to the company or the majority (in number, though
not in voting rights) of the shareholders is an act which the dominant shareholders are
legally entitled to do or at least, entitled to ratify. 7 In such situations, the shareholders with
a minority of voting rights could be helpless and the only viable remedy may be to exit the
company. Consequently, majority rule in the corporate context was identical with the Wall
Street rule that shareholders who are dissatisfied with the policies of the corporation should
sell their shares.8 In order to remedy this helplessness, minority shareholders' protection
laws have been enacted in many jurisdictions across the world.
Minority shareholders’ protections are mechanisms put in place to shield or remedy
shareholders from abuse of their rights, especially as they do not hold enough shares to
exercise control over the decisions made by the corporation that could have resulted in such
abuse. While there are many mechanisms that can be put in place to protect the interests of
minority shareholders ranging from social to economic to political or legal, this thesis will
focus on legal protections available under Canadian 9 and Nigerian corporate law,
specifically the derivative action and oppression remedy. It is important to note that the
application and scope of the derivative action and oppression remedy are influenced greatly
by the nature of the corporation and the closeness of the relationships between the
stakeholders of the corporation. In other words, these remedies are likely to be particularly
“Physical majority” and “physical minority” in this sense, refers to the number of the shareholders as
opposed to the number of shares held by the shareholders.
7
SH Goo, Minority Shareholders Protection (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1994) at 2.
8
Brett McDonnel, “Setting Optimal Rules for Shareholder Proxy Access” (2011) 43 Ariz.St. L.J 67 at 75.
9
This thesis will focus on the federal business corporation act, i.e. the CBCA. Further reference to “Canadian
corporate law”, unless specified otherwise, means the CBCA.
6
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important in circumstances where shareholders cannot effectively monitor the operations
of the directors and management of the corporation.

The primary law regulating companies and shareholders protection in Nigeria is the
Companies and Allied Matters Act (“CAMA”).10 Due to the colonial history of Nigeria and
Britain, the substantive provisions of the CAMA are derived largely from the UK
Companies Act of 1948 and principles from a number of English judicial decisions.
Canadian corporate law, on the other hand, is governed by the federal statute –the Canada
Business Corporations Act (“CBCA”)11 and other corporate law statutes which regulate
corporate law in each province and territory of Canada.12Although the English Common
Law is the common foundation of both Nigeria and Canada, Canadian company law has
evolved and has over the years reached a much higher level of sophistication compared to
Nigerian company law and practice, which will be highlighted in this thesis.

This thesis aims to provide an insightful and comparative perspective on the extent to
which minority shareholders’ protection under Canadian and Nigerian company law really
does protect minority shareholders. This thesis will carve out the restrictions placed on
some of these minority shareholder protection provisions, which may be obstacles to the
adequate protection for minority shareholders of the corporation. It will further identify
research highlighting the extent to which minority shareholders’ protection can facilitate
dispersed investments in an economy. This thesis will then provide recommendations in
relation to legislative amendments, as well as the institutional expertise required to
implement these “legislative amendments” which may, in turn, promote investments in
Nigeria.

10

Cap C20, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004.
RSC 1985, c. C-44
12
These provincial and territorial statutes are – Ontario Business Corporations Act 1982 SO c4, Manitoba
Corporations Act SM 1976 c40, Saskatchewan Business Corporations Act RSS 1978 CB10, Alberta Business
Corporations Act 1981 cB15, New Brunswick Business Corporations Act SNB 1981 Cb9.1, Yukon Business
Corporations Act RSY 1986 c15, British Columbia Business Corporations Act RSBC 1996, Quebec,
Business Corporations Act 2011, Prince Edward Island Business Corporations Act 2018, Nova Scotia
Companies Act 1989 R.S, c. 101, s.1, Northwest Territories Business Corporations Act 1996, c.19, Nunavut
Business Corporations Act,1998 SI 005-98, and Newfoundland Corporations Act SN 1986 c12.
11
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This thesis is set out in five chapters:
Chapter 1: Distinction between Company and Corporation and Historical Development of
Nigerian and Canadian corporate law. Under the Nigerian corporate legal system, the term
“corporation” is frequently associated with government enterprises rather than private
sector entities while under the CBCA this is not the case. This chapter points out that the
term “corporation” as used under the CBCA and the term “company” as commonly used in
Nigeria have the same conventional meaning. Chapter 1 identifies the legislative models
underlying Canadian and Nigerian corporate law and concludes that both models have
similar impact within the context of minority shareholders protection in their respective
jurisdictions. Chapter 1 further sets out a brief background of the principles of corporate
legal personality and majority rule, in order to appreciate the importance of minority
shareholders’ protection in both jurisdictions.
Chapter 2: Comparative Analysis of Derivative Action under Nigerian and Canadian
Company Law. This chapter provides a detailed comparison between the derivative action
provisions available under the CAMA and the CBCA. This chapter further examines the
attitude of the Nigerian and Canadian courts in interpreting derivative action provisions.
Chapter 3: Comparative Analysis of the Oppression Remedy under Nigerian and Canadian
Company Law. This chapter identifies the oppression remedy as one of the strongest tools
for minority shareholders in modern corporate law practice. It sets out a comparative
analysis of the oppression remedy provisions available under Nigerian and Canadian law
as well as the tests that have been pronounced and used by the Canadian courts, which are
not available under the Nigerian corporate legal system.
Chapter 4: Solving the Predicament. This chapter summarizes the differences between the
CAMA and CBCA derivative action and oppression remedy provisions. It reveals that there
are not many significant differences, and argues that the Nigerian minority shareholders
nevertheless enjoy lesser protection than Canadian minority shareholders because of the
lack of adequate enforcement. This chapter highlights the various enforcement patterns in
Nigeria that may hinder adequate protection of minority shareholders’ rights in Nigerian

5

corporations. This chapter further highlights the correlation between strong investor
protection and dispersed shareholdings in an economy.
Chapter 5: Conclusion.
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Chapter 1: Distinction between Company and Corporation
1.

Introduction

The words “company” and “corporation” are used interchangeably in different parts of the
world.13In some jurisdictions, corporate statutes specifically use the term “company”, while
others use the term “corporation”. For instance, Nigeria’s corporate law statute uses the
term “company” while Canada’s federal corporate law statute, the CBCA,14 uses the term
“corporation”. However, in Nigeria, the term “corporation” is frequently associated with
government-owned entities, while in Canada, the term “corporation” as used in the CBCA
has the same conventional meaning as “company” under the CAMA, i.e., an incorporated
entity set up by individuals for the purpose of carrying on business. This chapter identifies
that the Nigerian company law statute operates under a contractarian model, while the
CBCA operates under a division of powers model. This chapter further highlights the
fundamental attributes of the contractarian and division of powers models, in order to
determine whether the underlying theories of these models have an effect on minority
shareholders’ protections. Chapter 1 further reveals that there is not a significant practical
difference between both models such as to render a comparison between them unrealistic.
Finally, chapter 1 examines the background of corporate legal personality and majority
rule, in order to appreciate the importance of minority shareholders’ protection under both
jurisdictions
1.1.

Company vs. Corporation

As highlighted in the introductory section, the Nigerian corporate legal system is an
offshoot of the English Common law, 15 and its corporate legislation also uses the term
“company” just as in the United Kingdom. Under the English common law, the word
13

Christopher C Nicholls, Corporate law (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2005) [Nicholls] at 5.
By “Canadian statute”, I mean the CBCA. The reason this thesis will be focusing on the CBCA will be
discussed later in this chapter.
15
Although most Canadian corporate statutes no longer refer to their incorporated business organizations as
“companies”, the Nova Scotia statute is still called the Companies Act and was largely based on an early
version of the English Companies Act.
14
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“company” has no strict legal meaning. 16Historically, the word connotes an association of
persons who come together for a common purpose or objective.17In the conventional sense,
the word “company” is used when referring to a group of people associated together for
the purpose of obtaining an economic benefit like carrying on a business for profit. 18In
recent times, these “groups of people” would typically solidify their relationship by
incorporating a company under the Act for the purpose of carrying on a business, and in
order to identify the specific duties and powers of members of the company.
Under the Nigerian legal system, the term “corporation” is frequently associated with
government-owned enterprises rather than private sector entities. Although there is no legal
reason why the term “corporation” is frequently ascribed to government enterprises, the
correlation may have arisen from the fact that the names of some government-owned
enterprises usually end with the term “corporation”. 19 However, this is not the case under
the CBCA where the term “corporation” is used for all for-profit bodies corporate that are
incorporated under the statute. The term “corporation” is used more generally to connote a
body that may be incorporated for-profit, non-profit, ecclesiastical or charitable
purposes. 20Just like the word “company”, the word “corporation” is frequently used in a
conventional sense to mean “one particular species of a body corporate that exists to earn
profits: the business corporation”. 21 It is pertinent to note that the terms “company” as used
under CAMA and “corporation” as used under the CBCA have the same functional meaning
as they both refer to business organizations incorporated by one or more incorporators. 22
Having established the terms “corporation” and “company” are used to connote business
organizations and are not materially different especially in their usage in recent times, the
following sub-section will identify the legislative models underlying Nigerian and

16

Re Stanley [1906] 1 Ch. 131 at 134, Buckley J.
PL Davies, Daniel Prentice & LCB Gower, Gower’s principles of modern company law, 6th ed (London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 1997) at 3.
18
Ibid.
19
For example, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, Nigerian Railway Corporation, etc. 19
20
Nicholls, supra note 13 at 2.
21
Ibid at 6. Citing Frank Evans, “What is a Company?” (1910) 26 Law Quarterly Review 259 at 260.
22
For the purpose of consistency, the term “corporation” will be used throughout this thesis.
17
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Canadian corporate law in the context of minority shareholders’ protection in order to also
determine whether further comparison between both provisions in the statutes is realistic.
1.2.

Contractarian and Division of Powers Models in the context of Minority
Shareholders’ Protection

A contractarian company is generally known as an “English Model Company” or
“Memorandum and Articles of Association” company”.23 This is the model of companies
that characterizes the UK Companies Act, CAMA and the Canadian corporate statutes that
were originally based on the UK model. 24 The contractarian model is premised on the
theory that the company’s constitutional documents constitute a contract between the
company and its members and between the members and officers of the company. 25 This
contractual relationship is established by specific provisions in the corporate statutes
regulating companies in these contractarian jurisdictions.26The current corporate statute in
Nigeria - CAMA27- still retains the position that the Memorandum and Articles of
Association is the governing document for this type of company and forms a contract
between the company and its members and between the members and officers themselves.28

Furthermore, contractarian companies may be in various forms. CAMA provides that a
contractarian company could be an unlimited company, a company limited by guarantee
or a company limited by shares, 29 which may be public or private in nature. This thesis will
focus on companies limited by shares because it is the most usual form of company under
CAMA30 that attracts the most investors because of its limited liability feature. 31In other
words, the liability of the shareholders does not fluctuate but is limited to the extent of the

23

Bruce Welling, Corporate law in Canada (London: Scribblers Pub, 2006) at 114.
Nicholls, supra note 13 at 10.
25
Ibid.
26
For example, Section 41 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, C20, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria
2004 sets out this contractual orientation.
27
Cap C20, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.
28
Section 41 of the CAMA.
29
Section 21 of CAMA.
30
Alfred F Topham & E R Hardy Ivamy, Topham and Ivamy’s Company law (London: Butterworth, 1978)
at 3.
31
Manjeet Sahu, Classification of Companies, (2012) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2191869, Social Science
Research Network at 3.
24
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unpaid value of their respective shares.32 During the existence of the company or in the
event of winding up, a member can be called upon to pay the amount remaining unpaid on
the shares subscribed by the shareholder. 33

In view of the shareholding structure and limited liability feature, the company limited by
shares is best suited for the assessment of shareholders protection, particularly minority
shareholders, as investors are more willing to make investments in companies where their
liability is limited. The CBCA, on the other hand, operates under the Division of Powers
model which is the most common type of corporation under Canadian corporate law. 34Just
as the name suggests, the division of power statutes expressly divide powers between the
shareholders and management of the corporation,35 subject in certain cases, to the
provisions of a statutorily recognized agreement called a unanimous shareholder
agreement.36

There are two fundamental attributes of both models that will likely have an impact on
minority shareholders’ protection. First, a division of powers model clearly sets out the
powers and obligations of directors, officers, shareholders and perhaps creditors in the
incorporating statute. For instance, a division of powers statute usually has a section
empowering the directors to manage or supervise the management of the affairs and
business of the corporation, subject to any unanimous shareholder agreement.37 While the
“division of powers” attribute is not one originally found in the contractarian model, many
contractarian corporate statutes have adopted this feature as a “default” position and have
now set out powers and obligations of directors and shareholders in the incorporating
statute. For example, Section 63 of the CAMA38 statutorily empowers directors of a
company to manage the business of the company, subject to the provisions of the articles
of association of the company.

32

Ibid.
Section 27 (3) (b) of CAMA.
34
Nicholls, supra note 13 at 40.
35
See section 102 (1) CBCA.
36
See section 102 (1) CBCA.
37
See section 102 (1) CBCA.
38
Cap C20, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004.
33
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Second, a division of powers model takes on a remedy-oriented approach while the
contractarian model takes on a contractual and rights-oriented approach.39This means that
the division of powers model clearly provides for the status of key individuals in the
corporation like the shareholders, and sets out remedies for shareholders where their rights
have been abused. All the remedies under a division of powers model are statutory, while
the contractarian model is historically associated with contractual remedies whereby
shareholders can sue for breach of contract where their rights have been abused. In recent
times, many contractarian models have also adopted statutory remedies similar to those
provided in the division of powers model in order to protect minority shareholders from
any breach resulting from an abuse of power granted to persons under the statute. 40

It is pertinent to note that majority rule is the fundamental principle upon which the division
of powers statutes operate41 whereby the statutory powers outlined in the statutes are
expected to be performed by the majority of each body in the corporation – the board of
directors and shareholders as the case may be.42 However, the statute attempts to address
the excesses that the application of the majority rule may cause by creating extensive
remedies for minority shareholders and other complainants43. Thus, the division of powers
model makes provision for statutory remedies in the event that the statutory powers
provided in the constitution have been misused in some way. The importance attached to
minority shareholders protection in this type of corporate constitution can be seen, for
example in Section 247 of the CBCA which provides that a “complainant” 44 or creditor of
the corporation may apply to the court for an order directing a person to comply with, or
restrain from committing future breaches of the Act, regulations, articles, by-laws, or a

39

Welling, supra note 23 at 59.
For example, the CAMA sets out minority shareholders’ protection which will be assessed in chapter 2& 3
of this thesis.
41
Welling, supra note 23 at 62.
42
Although, there are some instances in which a two-third majority vote of shareholders is required rather
than merely a simple majority.
43
Welling, supra note 23 at 62.
44
For the purposes of section 247 of the CBCA, a “complainant” is a shareholder or former shareholder of the
company, or any of its affiliates, a director or an officer or former director or officer of the company, or any
of its affiliates, the CBCA Director or any other person who, in the discretion of a court is a proper party.
40
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unanimous shareholder agreement. This statutory provision provides shareholders with
access to judicial remedies wherever a breach of the corporate constitution occurs without
regard to the seriousness of the alleged breach. 45

A unique feature of the contractarian model is that the statute invariably establishes a
contractual relationship among the shareholders, and between the company and each
shareholder. 46This simply implies that any breach of the corporate constitution, i.e. the
Memorandum and Articles of Association, can be redressed by an action instituted for
breach of contract in the courts. 47 Thus, in addition to the statutory minority protections,
the contractarian model also provides for contractual remedies where the provisions of the
Memorandum and Articles have been breached. While this may appear to suggest that the
contractarian model affords minority shareholders a plethora of remedies – statutory and
contractual - the contractual remedy may not necessarily be adequate protection for
minority shareholders in the company. This is because a voting process is usually required
to amend and set out the contractual terms in the Memorandum and Articles of the
company, and depending on the corporate constitution, the shares may be divided into
distinct classes, with each class conferring different powers and rights to the shareholders.
Some shares may carry voting rights, while others may not.48 A few individuals may hold
enough “voting” shares to cast sufficient votes to determine the provisions of the
Memorandum and Articles of Association and how the corporation will be
run.49Consequently, an action for a breach of contract will more likely be geared towards
protecting the rights of the “majority” whose “voting shares” influenced the provisions of
the corporate constitution rather than the rights of minority shareholders. Where the votes
of the minority shareholders and majority shareholders are aligned with regard to the
provisions of the Memorandum and Articles, an action for a breach of contract may then
protect the rights of the minority shareholders.

45

Welling, supra note 23 at 64.
Ibid at 65.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid at 61.
49
Ibid.
46
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From the above, it is clear that both models have their distinctive features; however, the
CAMA has adopted many of the distinct features of the division of powers models, and so
has similar provisions with the CBCA, which is a division of powers model. The only
distinct feature of the contractarian statutes, i.e., the contractual relationship between the
members of the corporation and officers of the company incorporated under CAMA, has no
significant impact per se on minority shareholders’ protection in a corporation. Therefore,
a comparative analysis of the statutory provisions of the CAMA and the CBCA is
appropriate and useful, especially because the underlying structure of each statute is very
similar and as such, any recommendations for improvement may be easily effected in both
jurisdictions.
1.3.

Brief Background of Minority Shareholders’ Protection

As noted in the introductory section of this thesis, the need for remedies for minority
shareholders protection arose to mitigate the effects of the strict application of the corporate
legal personality principle and majority rule. This section will give a brief background of
minority shareholders’ protection, i.e. the corporate legal personality rule and rule in Foss
v Harbottle, as well as examine the relevance of the rule in modern corporate practice
within the respective jurisdictions, so as to underscore the importance of minority
shareholder protection.
1.3.1. Corporate Legal Personality of the Corporation
It is almost impossible to discuss majority rule without first reflecting on the cardinal
principle of company law, that is, the corporate legal personality rules. No doubt, the
relevance of the separate legal personality principle in company law and practice as laid
out in the locus classicus case of Salomon v Salomon and Co Ltd50cannot be
overemphasized. The case of Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd has been famously described
by Lord Templeman as the “unyielding rock of English company law” 51 while others have

50

[1897] AC 22.
Lord Templeman, “Company law lecture – forty years on” (1990) 11:1Company Lawyer 10 at 10.

51
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described it as a key principle of company law, 52 and have hailed it as making possible “the
industrial and commercial developments which have occurred throughout the world”.53
The legal personality principle is simply to the effect that the moment a company is
incorporated it assumes the status of a legal person capable of carrying out actions and
taking decisions in its own name as a natural person would. This theory is codified in both
the CBCA and CAMA54and has been reiterated by the Nigerian and Canadian courts in a
number of cases.55
A clear understanding of the legal personality principle of the corporation and the
implications of a company assuming the status of incorporation is a prerequisite for an
adequate grasp of the principle established in the English case of Foss v Harbottle56 which
forms part of the Nigerian corporate jurisprudence.57 The rule in Foss v Harbottle is said
to have arisen “inevitably from the doctrine of separate legal personality”,58 as suggested
by the Supreme Court of Canada,59citing a passage from the English Court of Appeal’s
judgment in Prudential Assurance co. v Newman Industries Ltd,60 in which the court
declared the Foss v Harbottle rule to be “the consequence of the fact that a corporation is
a separate legal entity”. 61 More recently, the Ontario Court of Appeal 62 expressly linked
the logic underlying the rule in Foss v Harbottle with that of the celebrated Salomon
principle:
The rule in Foss v. Harbottle provides simply that a shareholder of a
corporation – even a controlling shareholder or the sole shareholder – does
not have a personal cause of action for a wrong done to the corporation. The
52
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rule respects a basic principle of corporate law: a corporation has a legal
existence separate from that of its shareholders.

1.3.2. The Rule in Foss v Harbottle
The rule in Foss v Harbottle, an elementary principle of corporate law63 laid down in the
case of Foss v Harbottle, propounds that the court will not interfere with the internal
management of companies acting within their powers, and in fact, has no jurisdiction to do
so. As companies enjoy legal personality, they can assert rights of their own and could
institute an action to redress any wrong to recover moneys or damages alleged to be due to
the company, and such actions should prima facie be brought by the company itself. 64
In the case Edwards v Halliwell,65 the Court provided a comprehensive list of exceptions
to the Rule in Foss v Harbottle:
i.
ii.

iii.
iv.

where the action involved an illegal act or an act ultra vires the corporation;
where the action was not one that could be sanctioned by a simple majority
of the company’s members, but required, instead, the approval of some
special majority vote;
where the act gave rise to a personal right of action on the part of the
individual plaintiff; and
where the act constituted a fraud on the minority. 66

These exceptions suggest that the shareholder can obtain redress for a wrong in certain
circumstances. However, Wedderburn asserts that the exceptions are not real exceptions,
except for in cases of fraud,67 as they appear to be applicable only in situations in which
there is no chance of confirmation by the majority, and in such cases, the Rule cannot apply
in any event.68
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1.4.

The Relevance of the Rule

Under Nigerian company law, the Rule and its exceptions have been codified in Section
299 and 300 of the CAMA respectively. Section 299 provides as follows:
Subject to the provisions of this Act, where an irregularity has been committed
in the course of the company’s affairs or any wrong done to the company, only
the company can sue to remedy that wrong and only the company can rectify
the irregular conduct.
In addition to the above exceptions set out in Edwards v Halliwell,69CAMA also provides
for other instances where the Rule will not apply. For instance, the rule will not apply where
a company meeting cannot be called in time 70or where the directors are likely to derive a
profit or benefit or have profited or benefited from their negligence or from their breach of
duty.71Both sections 299 and 300 of CAMA have been re-affirmed by the Nigerian courts
on many occasions.72The Rule has been applied not only to incorporated bodies but also to
unincorporated associations. 73 It was applied to trade unions in Cotter v National Union of
Seamen74and Mbene v Ofili,75 on the ground that a union was a body possessing a
constitution or a set of rules prescribing the grievance procedure and also entitling it to sue
and be sued as a legal entity.
In Elufioye v Halilu 76 concerns were raised as to whether a rule of law such as that in Foss
v Harbottle, which technically strips the court of jurisdiction to grant remedies, and bars
minority shareholders of a corporation or association from addressing wrongs done to the
company and enforcing their rights were not contrary to the provisions of section 6(6) (b)
of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979.77The Constitution provides
that the judicial powers vested in the courts by section 6 (6) (b):
69
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shall extend to all matters between persons, or between government or
authority and to any persons in Nigeria, and to all actions and proceedings
relating thereto, for the determination of any question as to the civil rights and
obligations of that person.
That is to say, one of the questions for determination before the court was whether a ruling
preventing the court from interfering with the affairs of the company where the action to
redress the wrong is brought by minority members and the wrong is ratifiable by a simple
majority of members, would not be contrary to the provisions of Section 6(6) (b) of the
constitution that empowers the court to decide on all matters relating to the civil rights and
obligations of persons in Nigeria. The Supreme Court 78clarified this by stating that the rule
in Foss v Harbottle will not apply to exclude a person who can establish a personal right
that is distinct from that of the business of the association or company. In other words, the
court will not exclude a person from bringing an application for an injunction or declaration
with respect to any act or omission affecting the applicant’s individual rights as a member
or an action to obtain an oppression remedy.79 The implication of this is that where an
individual membership right is alleged to be violated, the court will, pursuant to its general
jurisdiction conferred upon it by section 6(6) (b) of the Constitution, intervene to grant
appropriate remedies at the instance of the minority shareholder, whereas in cases where
the alleged act is done to the company, such acts being capable of ratification by a simple
majority of members, the court will, in accordance with the rule in Foss v Harbottle, decline
assistance to the minority shareholder. 80
The court’s policy of not interfering in the internal affairs of the corporation to grant relief
to minority shareholders, where the alleged wrong is one affecting the corporate
membership rights and not shareholders’ personal rights is a fundamental problem for
minority shareholders’ protection under Nigerian law for two reasons. First, there is a thin
line between personal rights and corporate rights of a minority shareholder in a company.
Personal rights are attached to the status of membership in a corporation and are usually
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provided in the articles or statute, 81 while corporate membership rights are rights exercised
by a number of individual members acting in co-operation for instance, by resolution. 82
There is a possibility that some corporate membership rights affect the personal rights of
the shareholders, and the court’s refusal to intervene may be prejudicial to such individual
rights. The Supreme Court of Nigeria has identified the difficulty in effectively drawing a
clear distinction between a personal and a corporate right of a shareholder. In Globe
Fishing Industries Ltd v Coker,83 the Supreme Court, per Olatawura JSC, remarked as
follows:
The dividing line between personal and corporate right is very hard to draw,
and perhaps the most that can be said is that the court will incline to treat a
provision in the Memorandum or Articles as conferring a personal right on a
member only if he has an interest in its observance distinct from the general
interest which every member has in the company adhering to the terms of its
constitution.
Second, the basis upon which the rule in Foss v Harbottle was decided does not occur in
modern-day corporate law practice. In Foss v Harbottle where the court pronounced the
majority rule, it is pertinent to note that the corporate constitution (that is, the special act
of Parliament) of the Victoria Park Company in that case, empowered the shareholders in
a general meeting to decide whether to commence legal proceedings 84 and this power
ascribed to the shareholders was the basis upon which the decision in Foss v Harbottle was
reached.85 But typically in modern corporations, it is usually the responsibility of the
directors and not the shareholders to decide whether or not a corporation should pursue
legal action (although under Canadian law, a unanimous shareholders agreement could be
put in place to vest the directors’ managerial powers in the shareholders). 86 Thus, unlike
the situation in Foss v Harbottle, “there is no means whereby a majority of the shareholders
in a modern corporation can authorize an action in the corporate name on behalf of the
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company against the wishes of the board of directors”. 87 In other words, since the
shareholders are not the body empowered to decide whether a legal action is brought in the
name of the company, it is then predictable that minority shareholders will turn to the court
for a remedy especially where the directors do not institute the action. Where the courts
then refuse on the basis that it is the company that should sue (which is in reality a decision
made by the directors), this may lead to prejudice to the rights of the minority shareholder.

It can, however, be argued that since Section 299 is made subject to other provisions of the
CAMA, which set out instances where a member of a company can institute legal action on
behalf of the company, it renders the Rule irrelevant and questions its applicability in
modern-day corporations. The question that arises is – why is the rule still retained in the
CAMA considering its irrelevance in modern-day corporations, and in view of the other
provisions of the CAMA? Specifically, the CAMA provides for a derivative action which
allows a member to institute or defend an action on behalf of a company to remedy a wrong
done to the company, subject to obtaining leave from the court.

With respect to the application of the Rule under Canadian company law, the Supreme
Court in Hercules Management Ltd v Ernst & Young 88 averted to the Rule in Foss v
Harbottle stating that individual shareholders have no cause of action in law for any wrongs
done to the corporation and that if an action is to be brought in respect of such losses, it
must be brought either by the corporation itself (through management) or by way of a
derivative action. 89 Despite the above judicial pronouncement, Professor Nicholls 90 argues
that there seems to be a diminished significance of the Rule under the Canadian modern
statutory derivative action regime and should have become a historical relic if not for the
occasional references to Foss v Harbottle by Canadian judges. Unlike Nigerian corporate
law, the rule in Foss v Harbottle is not codified under Canadian company law and as such,
it can be said that it is the corporate legislation, and not the “antique common law rule in
Foss v Harbottle that determines when an action can or cannot be brought in the corporate
87
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name”.91It can be argued that the insertion of the words “subject to other provisions of
CAMA” set out in CAMA renders the application of the Rule irrelevant. Also, the fact that
the circumstances under which the Rule was decided no longer apply in modern corporate
law practice questions the relevance of the Rule.

Commenting on the potential difficulty and confusion that the coexistence of both the
statutory derivative action provisions and the rule in Foss v Harbottle and its exceptions,
could pose, Beck had this to say:
On balance, however it seems clear that the section was intended to be a code
for the expansion and control of the derivative suit ... It would only lead to
confusion to allow both common law and statutory actions. A more orderly
development of the law would result from one point of access to a derivative
action and would allow for a body of experience and precedent to be built up to
guide shareholders. 92
This is not to suggest that there are not very good reasons for the courts to prevent
individual shareholders in the normal course from instituting legal action, for instance
where the action is based on the alleged diminution in value of their shares. 93 Such
limitations are generally advantageous to corporations, the judiciary and the economy at
large. For companies, it facilitates collective action,94 allows management to focus on the
daily running of the company business 95 and encourages corporate financing which is
decisively important for corporations. 96As regards the judiciary, it saves the courts’ time
and the public budget. 97 To the economy, the rule helps companies to prosper and the more
companies prosper, the better it is for the economy overall.98This is because if this rule did
not exist, shareholders and other stakeholders would probably institute actions in the name
of the company at any slight opportunity, thereby diverting the funds of the company for
91
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legal costs. However, with this rule in place, the company is not made to incur legal costs
as a result of potentially trivial or unmeritorious actions brought by stakeholders in the
company.

Despite the wavering relevance of the Rule, one factor that is certain is that the great
difficulties of this Rule gave rise to the current minority shareholders protection we have
under many corporate statutes today, most especially derivative actions. A derivative action
is a remedy devised to address the harm done to the company, rather than the harm done
to an individual shareholder. At a theoretical level, it may appear as though the difference
between a derivative action and personal action is very clear. However, in practice, it can
be difficult to distinguish one from the other especially when personal and derivative
actions are interrelated99, such as in the case of the payment of excessive remuneration to
directors.100 While payment of excessive remuneration is traditionally characterized as a
wrong to the corporation, it could also be characterized as a wrong to shareholders as it
may result in a depreciation of the value of their investments. The fact remains that it is
almost inevitable that wrong to a corporation will adversely affect the value of
shareholders’ investments in the corporation. 101 The Ontario Court of Appeal in Goldex
Mines Ltd v. Revill 102 recognized the difficulty of this interrelationship and confirmed that
the same wrongful act can be both a wrong to the company and to each shareholder. The
Court further provided some guidance in the determination of whether the wrong gave rise
to a personal or derivative action. The Court quoted with approval from the judgment of
Traynor C.J. in the California case of Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co.103 wherein Traynor
C.J. refers to Shaw v. Empire Savings & Loan Assoc:104
the court [in Shaw] noted the "well established general rule that a stockholder
of a corporation has no personal or individual right of action against third
persons, including the corporation's officers and directors, for a wrong or
injury to the corporation which results in the destruction or depreciation of
the value of his stock, since the wrong suffered by the stockholder is merely
M. Patrick Baxter, “The Derivative Action under the Ontario Business Corporations Act: A review of
Section 97” (1982) 27:3 McGill LJ 27 453 [Baxter] at 456.
100
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incidental to the wrong suffered by the corporation and affects all
stockholders alike." From this the court reasoned that a minority shareholder
could not maintain an individual action unless he could demonstrate the injury
was somehow different from that suffered by other minority shareholders. In
so concluding the court erred. The individual wrong necessary to support a
suit by a shareholder need not be unique to that plaintiff. The same injury may
affect a substantial number of shareholders. If the injury is not incidental to
an injury to the corporation, an individual cause of action exists.
The Court of Appeal interpreted Traynor C.J. to mean that a personal action would not
arise "simply because the corporation itself has been damaged and as a consequence of the
damage to it, its shareholders have been injured". 105In other words, such wrong done to the
shareholder must exist on its own circumstance and not be incidental to a wrong done to
the corporation for a personal action to exist. This test has been criticized on the ground
that the Court provided no clarity on what constitutes incidental injury and no reason why
an incidental injury should not be treated as a personal wrong if it actually affects the
personal rights of the shareholder. 106 Irrespective of the test employed by the Court, there
will always be grey areas that are not easy to categorize. 107Practically, all shareholder suits
cannot be “arbitrarily placed in one category to the exclusion of others”.108 In view of the
above, this thesis will focus on the adequacy of minority shareholders’ protections for both
personal injury and injury done to the corporation, that is, both derivative action and
oppression remedy. Thus, the remedies of “derivative actions” and “oppression remedies”
under both Nigerian and Canadian law will be considered in detail in the following chapter
in order to access how these provisions adequately protect minority shareholders, which
may, in turn, encourage capital market investments.
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Conclusion
In view of the fact that the CBCA operates under a division of powers model, while the
Nigerian corporate statute is based on a contractarian model, this chapter highlights the
features of both models in order to determine whether the two jurisdictions are extremely
different such that a comparison between them will be totally unrealistic. This chapter notes
that many contractarian corporate statutes model like the CAMA have adopted most of the
distinct features of the division of power model and as such, the remaining practical
differences between the two are not significant, such that they may be meaningfully
compared.

This chapter also sets out a brief background of the corporate law concept of majority rule
and assesses the relevance of the Rule in Foss v Harbottle under each jurisdiction. It reveals
that the rigid application of the corporate legal personality and majority rule created a need
for minority shareholders’ protection such as the derivative action which allows a
shareholder to obtain a remedy on behalf of the corporation for harm done to the
corporation. It further highlights the difficulty the courts face in distinguishing between a
wrong done to the corporation and one done to the shareholders as sometimes an act could
be both a wrong done to the corporation, as well as to the shareholder.
The following chapter will examine more closely the derivative action, i.e., the minority
shareholders’ protection that addresses wrongs done to the corporation under Canadian and
Nigerian corporate law.
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Chapter 2: Comparative Analysis of the Derivative Action under
Nigerian and Canadian Corporate Law
Introduction

In line with the objectives of this thesis, this chapter highlights one of the key minority
shareholders’ protections available under Nigerian and Canadian corporate law.
Specifically, this chapter reviews the statutory provisions relating to the derivative action
under both jurisdictions, in order to examine the extent to which the remedy adequately
protects minority shareholders today under Nigerian law. This chapter reveals certain areas
of convergence and other areas of uniqueness with respect to the derivative action under
Nigerian and Canadian corporate law. It also reveals how certain prerequisites to
commencing a derivative action provided in the statutes and the judicial interpretations of
these prerequisites may hinder the full protection of minority shareholders in a corporation.
This then buttresses the hypothesis that there is room for improvement of this provision
under Nigerian corporate law, to enable minority shareholders to feel adequately protected
and, in turn, more prepared to invest in Nigerian companies and so benefit the Nigerian
economy.
This chapter will focus on the derivative action because it is one of the two principal means
under the corporate law statutes through which minority shareholders may seek to address
harms. From the shareholders’ perspective, corporate wrongs can be done in two forms –
to the corporation or directly to the shareholders of the corporation. The derivative action
is usually instituted to remedy wrongs done to the corporation; 109 while the oppression
remedy is instituted to correct an oppressive or unfairly prejudicial act or an act that
unfairly disregards the interests of shareholders and certain other stakeholders in the
corporation. 110 However, as highlighted in chapter 2, some wrongs done to the corporation
may affect the rights or interests of the shareholders in the long run. Thus focusing on the
derivative action means assessing one of the two significant prongs under corporate law,
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through which minority shareholders’ rights may be protected whether directly or
indirectly, as the case may be.
Furthermore, emphasis will be placed on minority shareholders in a corporation because
their relationship with directors, members of the management (especially senior
management) and other majority shareholders may place them in a vulnerable position. In
modern-day corporations, directors are said to be the most powerful organ in the
corporation because of the wide range of powers they have. 111Directors are usually
empowered to manage or supervise the management of the corporation’s business and
affairs (by delegating some of their functions to officers of the corporation), except in cases
where the matter is specifically assigned to the shareholders in a general meeting. Because
the directors have a wide range of powers, and shareholders are in a vulnerable position
with respect to the directors, the statutes usually provide that directors exercise these
powers in a fiduciary manner. 112 However, there are instances where the directors or their
delegates engage in forms of self-dealing and insider trading which may result in
managerial consumption of privileges to the detriment of other stakeholders in the
corporation. 113
The shareholders, on the other hand, are empowered to make certain decisions, for
example, the decision to elect or remove directors. In most instances, corporate matters are
decided by a voting system dependent on the number of shares a shareholder holds in the
corporation, thereby enabling dominant shareholders to use their voting powers to the
detriment of the corporation. For instance, dominant shareholders in a corporation may
vote in favour of a certain transaction to be undertaken by the corporation even when it is
not likely that the corporation may be successful in that venture, but simply because the
dominant shareholder (s) may benefit from that business.
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With the provisions of a derivative action in place, minority shareholders are able to correct
wrongs done to the corporation by the directors, dominant shareholder (s) or even outsiders
which could subsequently affect their interests.

2.

Derivative Actions under the Nigerian Corporate Law

2.1. Introduction

As discussed in the previous chapter, the rule in Foss v Harbottle provides that only the
corporation can bring a suit when a wrong has been done to it, and, where such wrong can
be ratified by the majority of shareholders in a general meeting, the court will not interfere.
Section 299 of the CAMA codifies this common-law rule by providing that subject to
certain exceptions, “where an irregularity has been committed in the course of a company's
affairs or any wrong has been done to the company, only the company can sue to remedy
the wrong and only the company can ratify the irregular conduct”. A strict application of
this general rule may restrict the access of minority shareholders to remedy a corporate
wrong, despite the fact that the basis upon which the decision was reached in Foss v
Harbottle does not apply in modern business corporations. 114
The implication of this is that shareholders who want to remedy a wrong done to the
corporation can only do so if either the company itself (i.e., as determined by the directors)
decides to institute an action or if they fall under the exceptions to the rule in Foss v
Harbottle, now codified in the CAMA. A plethora of Nigerian cases have continued to
reiterate this principle. 115 In Tanimola & Ors v Surveys and Mapping Geodata,116 the
minority shareholders holding 6% of the company shares brought an action against the
directors on the ground that they had carried out some acts that were contrary to the
corporate constitution of the company. The court held that the operation of a company is
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principally by the will of the majority shareholders and “where there is litigation in respect
of the affairs of the company, the principle as to the competence of such action is generally
governed by what has become known as the rule in Foss v. Harbottle”.117Clearly, the
directors had breached the corporate constitution, however, the courts refused to interfere
with the affairs of the company on the basis of the rule in Foss v Harbottle as codified in
Section 299 of CAMA.
Although the common law rule as codified in Section 299 of the CAMA helps to curb a
number of frivolous actions that may be instituted by shareholders or other stakeholders,
and also ensures that the court is not interfering with the affairs of the corporation at the
slightest chance, 118 nevertheless it may also serve as a hindrance to the protection of
shareholders’ rights. This is because a restriction to bring an action to remedy a wrong
done to the corporation could as well be a restriction to bring an action to enforce the
shareholders’ rights. For instance, where the directors of the company are mismanaging its
profits and acting against their fiduciary duties, a shareholder who wants to bring an action
to remedy this wrong may be prevented on the ground that such wrong is one done to the
company and so should be brought by the company itself and not the shareholder. While
on the surface of things it is true that the wrong is one done to the company, it should be
noted that such mismanagement by the directors could result in shareholders not obtaining
the expected returns on their investments, or in the worst case, no returns on their
investments. This is the underlying concern of most shareholders.
In response to these difficulties arising from the common-law rule, the Nigerian Law
Reform Commission119recommended the introduction of the statutory derivative action to
strike a balance between the risk of unreasonable interference in the affairs of the company
on one hand and judicial recourse for the shareholders on the other hand.120 The derivative
remedy available under Nigerian corporate law is embodied in Sections 303 – 309 of the
CAMA. It is a statutory representative action instituted or defended by a shareholder on
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behalf of a company, in order to remedy a wrong done to a company in circumstances
where the directors are unwilling to institute an action on behalf of the corporation.121In the
case of Agip (Nigeria) Limited v. Agip Petrol Int’l 122, the Court defined a derivative action
as follows:
A derivative action also known as a shareholder derivative suit is a lawsuit
brought by a shareholder on behalf of a company against a third party.
Often the third party is an insider of the corporation such as the directors
or executive officers.
In most derivative suits instituted in Nigerian courts, the defendants are usually the
directors or executive officers, who are normally statutorily empowered to decide whether
or not to institute an action on behalf of the corporation. Because it is the directors who are
empowered to manage the business of the company, and where it is directors themselves
who are at fault, it is very unlikely that they will institute an action on behalf of the
company to remedy their own wrong. 123 In order to protect the interests of the company
and its shareholders while avoiding unreasonable interference with the management of the
company, the law allows stakeholders to initiate a derivative action against the directors or
any other wrongdoers provided those shareholders have fulfilled all statutory requirements
under the derivative remedy provision. Apart from protecting shareholders’ rights,
derivative action provisions also have deterrent objectives, i.e. the existence of the remedy
prevents managerial misconduct by imposing the threat of action by shareholders, which
may lead to personal liability of the directors or other wrongdoers as the case may be. 124
Even though this remedy plays a fundamental role in protecting shareholders’ rights and
interests, this remedy is not available in every circumstance. Just like many jurisdictions
across the world, the CAMA clearly states the circumstances under which this remedy will
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be available and also sets out the procedural requirements that a shareholder will need to
comply with before instituting a derivative action. These requirements are discussed below.
2.1.2. Who may bring a Derivative Action?

Section 309 of the CAMA lists the categories of persons that may bring an application for
a derivative action. These are:
a)

a registered holder or a beneficial owner and a former registered holder or beneficial
owner, of a security of a company;

b)

a director or an officer or a former director or officer of a company;

c)

the Corporate Affairs Commission; or

d)

any other person who in the discretion of the court, is a proper person to make an
application under Section 303, i.e., the derivative action provision in CAMA.

Emphasis will be laid on subsection (a) because the focus of this thesis is on the legal
protection available to minority shareholders and this sub-section empowers a registered
holder or beneficial owner or former registered or beneficial owner of a security of a
company to bring an application for a derivative action. A registered holder of a security
of a company is a holder of record that has shares directly with the company. Beneficial
ownership includes ownership of shares through any trustee, legal representative, agent or
other intermediaries.
Clearly, section 309 of the CAMA specifies the categories of persons authorized to bring
an application for a derivative action and also empowers the Nigerian court to use its
discretion in permitting a person to bring an application for a derivative action. With
respect to the latter, it appears that the intention of the legislature is to allow a broader
number of persons not expressly mentioned under the section to be able to bring an action,
subject to the discretion of the courts. However, it appears as though the courts are not very
willing to use this discretion. In the case of Chief Akintola Williams & ors v Edu 125 the
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Court of Appeal in Nigeria was of the view that a non-member of a company cannot
institute a derivative action under the section. The court noted as follows:
section 303 (1) of the CAMA allows a shareholder to commence derivative
action under certain circumstances set out therein. I am of the view that
none of those circumstances can arise. The plaintiff herein is not shown
to be the shareholder of the 7th defendant company. It is for the foregoing
reason that claims 2, 3, and 4 of the respondent ought to be struck out for
want of locus standi.126
While the court correctly confirmed that the plaintiff was not a shareholder, the court did
not acknowledge that it had the discretionary power to allow a plaintiff to institute this
action if it thought the plaintiff was a proper person. Instead, the court refused to allow the
plaintiff on the basis that he was not a shareholder and did not have locus standi in the
reliefs sought. The test adopted by the court to determine whether the plaintiff was a proper
party is the “locus standi” test. One may assume that the court will apply this locus standi
principle in exercising its discretion in allowing a proper person to sue. Surprisingly, the
courts have continued to apply this principle in generally deciding whether or not to accept
a derivative application, even where the plaintiff is a member of the association or company
as the case may be and has been clearly given the “standing” to bring an application for a
derivative action by virtue of the provisions of the CAMA. In other words, the Nigerian
courts have denied members of a council (the decision-making body) of a body corporate
(equivalent to the directors in a corporation) from bringing a derivative action on the basis
of lack of locus standi even though the derivative action provision allows directors of the
corporation to bring an application for leave to commence such an action.
In the case Adenuga v Odumeru,127the Supreme Court reiterated this position where it held
that even though the plaintiffs were financial members of the body corporate and were
instituting an action against the defendants on behalf of the council,128 i.e., the decision
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making body of the association, they did not have the locus standi129 to institute such an
action. The court emphasized the sufficient interest rule:
The mere fact that appellants are financial members of the eighth defendant
has not conferred on them Locus Standi because that alone would not
disclose sufficient interest for them to bring this action. Looking at the
statement of claim, the appellants have not disclosed sufficient interest to
justify their bringing this action. A party must in his statement of claim aver
enough facts to indicate what his interests are in the matter and how those
interests stand threatened if the action was not brought. It is not enough to
blandly state that he has an interest; there must be an averment that the
interest is threatened. 130

In other words, apart from ensuring that an individual (s) falls within the categories of
persons listed under the CAMA or is permitted by virtue of the exercise of discretion of the
courts, the courts usually examine whether the plaintiff has sufficient interest and such
interest must be real, expressly set out on its statement of claim and not merely
imaginary.131 The question that then arises is - whether the express authorization of certain
stakeholders under the statute to bring an application for leave to commence a derivative
action is not enough to confer on them locus standi? Why do the plaintiff’s personal
sufficient interests matter? This extraneous condition adopted by the courts is quite
restrictive as the Act expressly sets out the categories of persons that may apply for leave
to institute a derivative action and makes no mention of other factors. This is not to say that
the courts should permit every person to bring a derivative action but such judgment should
be decided solely by adhering to the provisions of the statute (which sets out the persons
who can bring an application for leave to commence a derivative action) and not by
introducing some extraneous test – “sufficient interests”- so as not to frustrate the intentions
of the legislature which is clearly to accommodate the persons specified in the section to
seek redress on behalf of the company. 132
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2.1.3. Application to Court for Leave to Initiate a Derivative Action under CAMA

Further to Section 303 (1) of the CAMA, an applicant may apply to the court for leave to
bring an action in the name or on behalf of a company, or to intervene in an action to which
the company is a party, for the purpose of prosecuting, defending or discontinuing the
action on behalf of the company. The rationale for making an applicant apply for leave is
to help reduce the amount of trivial or malicious actions brought before the courts, and the
costs the company will bear in defending the numerous suits especially if the financial
effect on the company may outweigh its benefits even if the claim has merit.133More so,
“uncontrolled access to the remedy could also result in potential directors feeling so
vulnerable to suit that they decline such positions and companies and their directors facing
underserved reputational and financial damage due to a proliferation of spurious
actions”.134
While the CAMA provides the requirement of the application for leave to commence a
derivative action, it does not set out the procedure required to be adopted in applying for
the leave from the courts. In Agip (Nigeria) Ltd v Agip Petroleum International &
Ors,135the minority shareholders commenced an action by filing a Writ of Summons and
also filed an ex parte application for leave to commence the derivative action in the name
of the company. With respect to the mode of commencing the action, the court held that
“by the community reading of sections 303 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act and
Rules 2 (1) and (2) of the Companies Proceedings Rules, an application for leave to
prosecute a derivative action is to be commenced by an originating summons and not
otherwise.” 136 The court went further to note that where any proceedings are begun other
than as provided in the Rules, such proceedings are incompetent. And once there is a defect
in competence, it is fatal and the proceedings are a nullity.137 In other words, the court
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refused to overlook the wrongful commencement mode -Writ of Summons - and treat it as
a mere irregularity. 138
The decision of the courts is not surprising as Rules 2 (1) and (2) of the Companies
Proceedings Rules provide that “every application under the Act shall be made by
originating summons” and perhaps the use of the word “shall” in Rule 2, which connotes
a mandatory requirement, was the basis upon which the court insisted on that mode and
refused to treat it as a mere irregularity. The issue is that adherence to technicality does
more harm than good to our corporate legal system. A Writ of Summons clearly states the
parties, issues, and reliefs of the applicant, in the same way as an Originating Summons;
so long as both documents show proof of the conditions to be satisfied as provided under
CAMA, why then should a mere technicality be the basis upon which the courts refuse to
grant such leave? More so, the trial court in the above-reported case had noted that the
basis upon which he had granted the leave in the first place was because he had examined
the documents which led him to the conclusion that the applicants had a prima facie case.
This is not to say that the provisions of the Rules should be disregarded. However, in the
absence of legislative amendment, the court should adopt a more flexible approach such
that where the non-compliance is one that relates to the form and not substance of the
application, then the court should apply the principles of equity and not outrightly declare
it a nullity.
The strict adherence to technicalities as displayed in the Agip case may have amounted to
injustice to the minority shareholders who were not able to obtain a remedy partly because
they commenced the action with the wrong mode. Even though the application will still
have been dismissed on the ground that the defendants did not receive notice of the motion
filed by the plaintiff which is against the cardinal principle of fair hearing, the express
declaration by the court that the action was a nullity on the ground that the applicants
commenced the action with the wrong mode implies that the court would have made the
same decision even if the fair hearing principle was not violated.
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In practice, once this leave is granted to a minority shareholder, such shareholder is then
empowered to institute an action on behalf of the company regardless of the rule in Foss v
Harbottle. The court must, however, be satisfied that the following conditions stipulated in
CAMA139 are present before a leave for a derivative action can be granted:
a) the wrongdoers are the directors who are in control, and will not take necessary
action;
b) the applicant has given reasonable notice to the directors of the company of his
intention to apply to the court for leave for a derivative action, if the directors of
the company do not bring, diligently prosecute or defend or discontinue the action;
c) the applicant is acting in good faith; and
d) it appears to be in the best interest of the company that the action be brought,
prosecuted, defended or discontinued. 140
Further emphasis will be laid on two conditions provided in subsection (b) and (c) that
appear to have vague interpretations.
2.1.3.1 Reasonable Notice to the Directors

Section 303 (2) (b) of CAMA requires the applicant to give reasonable notice to the
directors of the corporation of his intention to apply for leave for a derivative action. This
is very important because Section 303 ordinarily strips the directors of their statutory power
to authorize bringing an action in the name of the company, and therefore, it is only fair
that the directors are given notice of the proposed action to be instituted by the
shareholder. 141It is also possible that the directors may not have directed their minds to this
course of action and such notice will then give them the first opportunity to exercise their
statutory powers by instituting the action to redress the wrong.142 If the directors fail to
authorize the action after a reasonable amount of time, then the applicant may proceed to
file the application.
The challenge with this provision is that it does not stipulate the specific number of days,
weeks or months that will be deemed to be “reasonable notice” to the directors, in order
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for the court to grant leave for a derivative action. 143Thus, this provision may then be used
as a tool by the directors to delay such derivative action on the ground that the company is
not ready to take action and will require more time since there is no specific time stipulated
in CAMA.144 It also does not provide any exceptions to the pre-action notice; neither does
it give the court liberty to decide whether to do away with this provision, especially in the
event that it would not be expedient to do so. The specific content of the notice is also not
set out; perhaps, such notice should contain sufficient details to enable directors to know
the specific actions to remedy. Where the directors take action by filing the action on behalf
of the company, a derivative action will not be necessary. However, this is usually not the
case because where the directors are the wrongdoers in control (which is a condition
precedent for bringing the action) it is not likely that they will bring an action against
themselves.145 Dr. Aina is of the view that the requirement of notice to directors is
superfluous and unnecessary and may serve as an opportunity for directors to organize their
affairs or cover up their misdeeds.146 It is however arguable that removing this provision
may go against the principle of fairness, bearing in mind that the CAMA ordinarily
empowers directors to authorize bringing an action on behalf of the company, and
proceeding to do so without informing the directors may violate their statutory powers.
2.1.3.2 Good Faith

Section 303 (2) (c) of the CAMA provides that the applicant must show that the application
was filed in good faith. The essence of this provision is to ensure that derivative actions
are not brought out of personal vendettas against the directors of the corporation or do not
turn to vexatious actions. 147 Since CAMA does not provide a definition or guidance
regarding what constitutes good faith or bad faith, the Nigerian courts have looked at the
English cases to determine what the phrase “good faith” means. In Shodeinde & Ors v Reg.
Trustees of Ahmadiyya,148 the court defined “good faith” as the absence of bad faith. The
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court further noted that “a thing is done in good faith or bona fide where it is in fact done
honestly whether it is done negligently or not.” 149 The issue that arises with this definition
is how to determine “honesty”. In practice, what the applicant does is to simply declare on
the face of the application that the application is meritorious and supportable. 150
The disadvantage of this provision is that it may be somewhat difficult to prove because
where the directors, who normally have the responsibility of deciding what is in the
corporation’s best interests, have decided not to take action, it could be argued that any
action taken by any shareholder was brought in bad faith. 151 This provision also gives the
court wide discretion to shut out applications that may have been meritorious on the ground
that in the opinion of the court, it was not brought in good faith despite that the phrase is
not defined in CAMA.152
It is worthy to note that the above listed 4 conditions must all be satisfied before the court
can grant leave for instituting a derivative action. Therefore, the absence of any of the
above conditions will result in the court refusing to grant the leave to institute a derivative
action.
2.1.4. Powers of the Court

Further to Section 304 of the CAMA, a court hearing a derivative suit may at any time make
any order or orders as it deems fit. The court is also specifically authorized to make one or
more of the following orders:
a) authorizing the applicant or any other person to control the conduct of the
action;
b) giving directions for the conduct of the action;
c) directing that any amount adjudged payable by a defendant in the action shall
be paid, in whole or in part, directly to former and present security holders
of the company instead of to the company;
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d) requiring the company to pay reasonable legal fees incurred by the applicant
in connection with the proceedings. 153
Unlike the rule in Foss v Harbottle, where the court pronounced the importance of judicial
non-interference with any act that can be ratified by the majority, CAMA provides that the
court has no power to stay or dismiss an application merely because it is shown that an
alleged breach of right or duty owed to the company has been or may be approved by the
shareholders of such company. 154 However, the evidence of approval by the shareholders
may be taken into account by the court in making an order under Section 304 of the CAMA.
In other words, the issue of ratification is not a factor the court considers in granting leave,
however, the directors can show that the act has been ratified by the company and it is not
willing to take further action on the matter and such evidence may be considered by the
court in making orders.
Section 306 of CAMA also provides for instances where the parties agree to withdraw or
settle the matter out of court. The court must approve such discontinuance, settlement or
dismissal, and if the court is of the view that the rights of any applicant may be substantially
affected by such stay, discontinuance, settlement or dismissal, the court may order any
party to the application or action to give notice to the applicant. This provision is very
essential to the interests of a minority shareholder who may be an applicant, because it
prevents collusive settlements between the other parties for their benefit, at the expense of
the company or minority shareholder.155If the court believes that the discontinuance or
withdrawal will be detrimental to the rights of the applicant or company, the court may
refuse to approve such withdrawal or discontinuance and appoint an independent person or
inform the Corporate Affairs Commission to continue the matter. 156
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2.1.5. The Shortcomings of the Nigerian Derivative Action

No doubt, the derivative action provisions available under Nigerian law to a large extent
mitigate the hardship arising from the common law rule; however, the provisions are not
without shortcomings. The vagueness in the derivative action provision and the strict
interpretation adopted by the courts may have a significant impact on the protection of
minority shareholders’ rights. For instance, the pre-action notice required to be provided
by the applicant does not stipulate the number of days, weeks or months required. Also,
the rigid interpretation and rules of the courts in including the “locus standi” test and
insisting upon a particular procedural mode of commencement of the action can frustrate
the use of the derivative action as a remedial tool for minority shareholders’ protection.
Also, the lengthy proceeding arising from the tactical delays orchestrated by the directors
or their counsel as a result of the vague statutory provisions could be burdensome for
minority shareholders who do not want to incur legal costs chasing a matter for which they
are not certain to a reasonably probable degree that they will obtain a remedy. The situation
is even worse where the legal costs to be incurred over a long span of time are enormous
and unreasonable compared to the minority shareholders’ returns on investments unless the
court gives an order for the company to pay the interim costs of the applicant. 157In the
absence of such an order for interim costs, the best business decision for the aggrieved
minority shareholders will then be to discontinue the matter, or not institute the action in
the first place having calculated the estimated time span of the action, legal costs and the
chances of not obtaining a remedy.
The following section will examine the derivative remedy under Canadian corporate law
to determine whether its provisions have similar shortcomings or if it adequately protects
the interests of minority shareholders.
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2.2. Derivative Action under Canadian Corporate Law

2.2.1. Introduction
Under Canadian law, a derivative action is a remedy provided to a “complainant” that
enables him to bring an action in the name or on behalf of the corporation or any of its
subsidiaries in order to assert or defend the rights of the corporation or subsidiary. 158 It has
been described as the “minority shareholder’s sword to the majority’s twin shields of
corporate personality and majority rule”. 159In other words, this remedy allows
complainants the opportunity to challenge any misuse of managerial power on behalf of
directors or managers of the corporation, irrespective of the rule in Foss v Harbottle and
the corporate legal personality principle. Without this remedy, a minority shareholder will
only be able to rectify a wrong done to the corporation or to his rights or overcome the
difficulties that may arise from corporate personality and majority rule by persuading the
majority shareholders to agree with his point of view or to use their “majority rule” power
to replace the incumbent board of directors who have the power to cause the corporation
to sue.160
Just as under Nigerian law, the majority rule in Foss v Harbottle worked great hardship on
minority shareholders most especially because of the limited exceptions that were available
under the common law. Due to the hardship arising from the strict application of this rule,
it became imperative for Canadian legislators to create statutory remedies that could
adequately protect minority shareholders in a corporation. 161As highlighted in Chapter 1,
the Ontario government set up a committee in 1967 to make proposals for corporate law
reform, including provisions relating to minority shareholders’ protection. The product of
this committee was the Lawrence Report which made recommendations for the derivative
action remedy and other statutory remedies. 162 The model reform that was recommended
by the Lawrence Report for Ontario was later adopted at the federal level in the Dickerson
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Report for the CBCA. This resulted in the enactment of sections 239163 and 240164 of the
CBCA.
It is important to note that the Canadian derivative action is very similar to the derivative
action provisions available under Nigerian corporate law. Just like the Nigerian legislators
who adopted section 210 of the U.K Companies Act of 1948, while also considering the
recommendations made by the Jenkins Committee of 1959,165the Dickerson
Committee166recommended the adoption of the OBCA provisions which were also
influenced primarily by the recommendations made by the Jenkins Committee. However,
as will be highlighted below, certain aspects of the Canadian derivative action provisions
have been amended to provide more clarity and address the current realities of corporate
law practice.
2.2.2. Proper Party to Initiate Derivative Action

The CBCA permits the same group of persons to bring an application for a derivative action
as under the Nigerian derivative action provision. However, the CBCA expands this list to
include a registered or beneficial owner or former registered or beneficial owner of any of
the affiliates of the corporation. 167Just as under the Nigerian derivative action provision
which permits the CAC to bring a derivative action, the CBCA permits the CBCA Director
to bring a derivative action.168The CBCA also has a blanket phrase that allows the courts to
permit any other person who in the discretion of the court is a proper person to make the
application. In deciding whether a person is a proper person, the Canadian courts have
noted that the purpose of the derivative action should be borne in mind, which is for
minority shareholders’ protection and ensuring accountability. For instance, in the case of
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a creditor 169 who claims to be a proper person, the question is whether he would be a person
who would reasonably be entrusted with the responsibility of advancing the interests of the
corporation by seeking the remedy to right the wrong allegedly done to the corporation.170
If the answer is in the affirmative, then the creditor might be pronounced to be a proper
person by the courts.
As highlighted above, the derivative action provision under the CBCA permits a registered
or beneficial or former registered or beneficial owner of a security to initiate a derivative
action not only in respect of the corporation itself but also in respect of a wrong done to
an affiliate of the corporation. Companies that are in any of the following types of
relationship are regarded as affiliates: holding company and subsidiary company; two or
more subsidiaries of a common holding company; two or more companies controlled by
the same person. 171 This is a great tool in protecting minority shareholders in the sense
that the directors of an affiliate cannot hide under the corporate personality rule asserting
that the minority shareholder has no basis to sue since he is not a shareholder in the affiliate
of the corporation. The effect of this is that, if for instance a director of a thriving
subsidiary mismanaged profits or breached their fiduciary duties as a director,
shareholders of a parent company will be allowed to bring a derivative action on behalf
of the affiliate.172
2.2.3. Application to Court for Leave to Initiate a Derivative Action under CBCA

Section 239 (1) of the CBCA provides as follows:
A complainant may apply to a court for leave to bring an action in the name
and on behalf of a corporation or any of its subsidiaries, or intervene in an
action to which any such body corporate is a party, for the purpose of
prosecuting, defending or discontinuing the action on behalf of the body
corporate. [Emphasis added].
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The application for leave is fundamental to commencing a derivative suit on behalf of the
corporation. Unlike the Nigerian corporate law, the CBCA gives an unrestrictive context
on the mode of application for leave for a derivative action. Section 248 of the CBCA
provides that an application by a complainant may be made in a summary manner by
petition, originating notice of motion or otherwise as the rules of the court provide or
subject to any order the court thinks fit. In the case of Muljadi v. O’brien,173the court
examined section 247 of the OBCA to determine whether the language makes it mandatory
for a party seeking an oppression remedy to go only by way of an application. Section 247
of the OBCA provides that “a complainant…..may apply to the court for an order under
the section”. The court held that since the section used the word “may” and not “shall”,
then it appears the moving party has the power to decide upon the best approach.
Furthermore, the court noted that when the legislature intended to take away discretion
from counsel, it must say so in plain language and that was not the situation in section 247
of the OBCA. Although the above-cited case was made in relation to the oppression remedy
provision under the OBCA, the case is still significant here in relation to the interpretation
provided by the court of the word “may” which is also used in section 248 of the CBCA.
Applying the same logic to section 248 of the CBCA, the section provides that the
application “may” be made in a summary manner but also leaves in the discretion of the
party seeking the remedy the decision to go by way of an action.174 This leaves the
complainant with options on the manner in which he can apply for leave for a derivative
action and helps to simplify the procedure – a feature not present under Nigerian corporate
law.
Conflict may arise between the provisions of section 248 CBCA and the rules of the court
where the mode set out in the rules is different from that provided under section 248.175
However, in the event that a party chose the wrong form of originating process, the Ontario
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Court of Appeal noted in Chilian v Augdome Corp,176 in compliance with civil procedure
rules,177 that the court will not set aside the originating process on this ground. The court
further noted that the current Canadian law does not reflect the attitude underlying the old
common law rule where a litigant was non-suited for adopting the wrong form of
action.178This position was reiterated in the case of Nuvex Ingredients Inc v. Snack Crafters
Inc.179 Clearly, the Canadian courts adopt a flexible approach in deciding the appropriate
mode of originating process used in applying for leave to commence a derivative action
because of the legislative provisions and understand that dismissing an action based on the
wrong mode of commencement would imply that the Canadian law is still subject to the
unnecessary technicalities underlying the common law regime.
Apart from the procedural issues, there are also substantive requirements the court looks
out for when granting leave to commence a derivative action. The court will not grant the
application for leave to commence a derivative action unless the following conditions are
satisfied:
a) the complainant has given notice to the directors of the corporation or its
subsidiary of the complainant’s intention to apply to the court to initiate
or defend a derivative action not less than fourteen (14) days before
bringing the application, or as otherwise ordered by the court, if the
directors of the corporation or its subsidiary do not bring, diligently
prosecute or defend or discontinue the action;
b) the complainant is acting in good faith; and
c) it appears to be in the interests of the corporation or its subsidiary that the
action be brought, prosecuted, defended or discontinued. 180
The above requirements are conjunctive and not mutually exclusive, and so if all of the
requirements are not present, the court will not allow a derivative action to be brought or
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defended. With respect to the first requirement, all that is required is a notification to the
directors, which can be accomplished by sending a written request to the board of the
corporation or by serving them with the notice of the application. 181 Both methods would
clearly show the lapse of time since the notice was given, as the statutory provision requires
not less than 14 days' notice. Failure to provide evidence of this statutory notice will usually
be fatal to an application for leave to commence a derivative action. 182 However, in some
cases, the shareholder may be unable to give the stipulated notice, such as, where the matter
is one that requires the urgent attention of the court or where providing such notice will
amount to unnecessary delay. In such instances, the court retains the power to dispense
with the notice requirement. 183
The second requirement seeks to ensure that the complainant, i.e. typically a minority
shareholder, in this case, is acting in good faith. Unfortunately, the CBCA does not give
further context or guidelines to determine what “good faith” means. In Winfield v Daniel, 184
the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench noted that “good faith” exists where “there is a prima
facie reason to believe that the applicant is acting with proper motives, i.e., a reasonable
belief in the merits of the claim”. 185 Usually, the court expects the applicant to establish
clearly on a preponderance of evidence that the application is brought in good faith. 186 In
First Edmonton Place v 315888 Alberta Ltd,187 the court held that good faith is shown if
the action is not motivated by a personal vendetta, and is not frivolous or vexatious.
Furthermore, in Primex Investments Ltd. v Northwest Sports Enterprises Ltd. et al,188 the
court held that mere self-interest does not constitute bad faith if the interests of the applicant
and the corporation simply coincide; there must be other circumstances suggesting that the
application is not brought in good faith.
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Just like the other prerequisites, where the complainant is unable to prove good faith, the
court will usually not grant leave to institute a derivative action. In McAskill v
TransAtlantic Petroleum Corp 189 the minority shareholder opposed the corporate merger
of the corporation with another oil and gas corporation. He brought a derivative application
on behalf of the corporation alleging that the union of the corporations was improvident
and that some of the directors of the corporation were negligent, and had acted in breach
of their duties. He had earlier proposed an arrangement which involved a large retainer and
use of an airplane for a business owned by him. The court refused to grant leave on the
basis that the applicant was not acting in good faith but was motivated by a personal
vendetta stating that his inability to give any reason for not bringing action against all
directors and his proposed arrangement were all indicative of bad faith.
From the above, it is clear that even the courts have no definitive guidelines to determine
what the phrase “good faith” means. In practice, the court examines the circumstances of
each case in order to determine whether such an application was brought in “good faith”
or not.190Professor Welling is of the opinion that this provision is meaningless especially
because there are no clear cut rules to determine good faith and the provision, therefore,
gives the judiciary the freedom to interpret the requirements as it likes or dismiss the
application on the basis that in the opinion of the court, the applicant did not prove his good
faith.191 However, eliminating this provision may open the directors to all sorts of litigation
as stakeholders may bring an application for leave to commence a derivative action based
on personal vendettas. Perhaps, providing guidelines as to determining what “good faith”
connotes will help limit the courts’ discretionary power and create certainty for
complainants prior to instituting the action to determine whether their matter will be
considered as being brought in good faith or not.
Finally, the court must be satisfied that the proposed derivative action is brought in the
interests of the corporation or its subsidiary. The court need not be convinced that the
proposed action is in fact in the best interest of the corporation but the court must be
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satisfied that it appears to be in the corporation’s interest that the derivative action is
initiated.192 In other words, the question that is to be raised by the court is whether the
action has some prima facie merit, rather than whether the application will be successful. 193
2.2.4. Powers of the Court hearing a Derivative Action

Upon granting leave to institute or defend a derivative action, the court will hear the
application of the complainant and the defendants, who are usually the directors or
shareholders who oppose the application for leave. The court may at any time during
the action make any order it thinks fit including, without limiting the generality of
the foregoing, the following: 194
a)

an order authorizing the complainant or any other person to control the conduct
of the action;

b)

an order giving directions for the conduct of the action;

c)

an order directing that any amount adjudged payable by a defendant in the
action shall be paid, in whole or in part, directly to former and present security
holders of the corporation or its subsidiary instead of to the corporation or its
subsidiary; and

d)

an order requiring the corporation or its subsidiary to pay reasonable legal fees
incurred by the complainant in connection with the action.

Just as provided under the Nigerian legislation, the court may at any time order that the
corporation or its subsidiary pays the legal fees incurred by a minority shareholder in a
derivative suit. An order for interim costs allows the company to fund the expenses of
litigation that a complainant may not be able to afford. Thus, a shareholder who is not
financially buoyant can also pray the court to make an order directing the company to bear
his legal costs. Furthermore, the mere fact that an alleged breach of a right or duty of a
corporation has been ratified by the majority of shareholders in the corporation does not
mean that the court will automatically dismiss or stay the application for a derivative action
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– which is contrary to the rule laid down in Foss v Harbottle. However, the court may take
into consideration the evidence of the approval of the shareholders in making an order. 195
2.3. Comparison of Minority Shareholder Remedy of Derivative Action under
Nigerian and Canadian Corporate Law

This section will conduct a comparative analysis of the derivative action available as a
minority shareholder protection under Nigerian and Canadian corporate law. Although the
statutory provisions and judicial decisions from both jurisdictions are to a large extent
similar, there are certain significant areas of differences between both legal systems. This
section will also assess the impact these differences have on the protection of minority
shareholders under Nigerian and Canadian corporate law respectively. Some of the
significant differences in the minority shareholder remedy of derivative actions are set out
below:
2.3.1

The Mode of Commencement

The Nigerian Companies Proceedings Rules provides that all applications which include
the derivative application should be made by originating summons. 196 The Nigerian courts
have dismissed any derivative application not brought in this form. The Canadian corporate
law, on the other hand, provides that a derivative action may be made in a summary manner
but also leaves in the discretion of the party seeking the remedy to proceed by way of
action.197 Most importantly, the courts have pronounced, in line with civil procedure rules,
that they will not set aside the originating process on the ground of wrong mode of
commencement. 198 The implication of this is that even where the counsel uses a wrong
mode of originating process for a derivative action leave application, the court will not
dismiss the application on that basis, and so, minority shareholders or their counsel, as the
case may be, do not have to worry about the technicalities involved with filing an
application for a derivative action. The legal technicality apparent in the Nigerian corporate
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legal system with respect to derivative actions may bar applicants from accessing justice
as it increases costs of litigation in terms of time and financial expenses. This is because
where an application or a judgment given pursuant to a wrong mode of commencement is
nullified,199 the applicant may be frustrated and decline to apply again having incurred legal
cost without obtaining a remedy.
2.3.2. Proper Parties to Initiate a Derivative Action

Nigerian and Canadian corporate law empowers holders of securities of a corporation to
initiate or defend an action on behalf of the corporation provided certain requirements are
satisfied. While Canadian law recognizes the right of a shareholder to bring derivative
actions both in respect of a corporation and any of its affiliates, 200 Nigerian corporate law
does not extend such right to the affiliates of the corporation. What occurs under Nigerian
corporate law is that a shareholder is only empowered to bring an action on behalf of the
corporation in which it has its shareholding, and so, an application for leave to institute a
derivative action brought by a shareholder on behalf of an affiliate may be refused on the
ground that he lacks the locus standi to do so. 201 This may negatively impact minority
shareholders’ protection. For instance, where the directors of a subsidiary mismanage
profits that subsequently affect the profits of the corporation in which the shareholder is a
member, the shareholder of the parent company may not be allowed to bring a derivative
action against the directors, subject to the discretion of the court. Given the Nigerian
judiciary’s strict adherence to precedent, it is very unlikely that the courts will be willing
to grant such a shareholder a leave to institute a derivative action on behalf of a subsidiary
of a corporation in which the applicant is a registered holder of a security.202In accordance
with the provisions of the CBCA, the Canadian courts on the other hand, will allow a
shareholder of a parent company to bring a derivative action on behalf of the corporation
or any of its affiliates.
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In view of the above prejudice that could arise from this provision, and the need to provide
a more suitable legal framework for investors, the 8th Session of the Nigerian National
Assembly created the National Assembly Business Environment Roundtable (NASSBER)
to ensure that the legal and regulatory framework promotes enterprise, growth and the right
environment for investments. The product of the NASSBER was the enactment of the
Companies and Allied Matters (Repeal and Re-enactment) Bill which has recently been
passed by the Nigerian House of Representatives. 203 The Bill extends the powers of
shareholders to bring an action on behalf of a subsidiary of the company. It is the hope that
this Bill is passed into law so as to enable shareholders of a corporation to bring an action
on behalf of a subsidiary of a corporation in which it is a registered holder of security. 204
2.3.3. Notice to Directors before Commencing Derivative Action

The CBCA requires a complainant to show that he has given a notice of not less than 14
days to the directors of the corporation informing them of his intention of instituting a
derivative action or as otherwise ordered by the court. The CAMA only requires that the
complainant shows that “reasonable notice” of his intention to apply to the court has been
given to the directors of the company. The challenge with this provision is that the phrase
“reasonable notice” is not defined in the CAMA and so the directors can argue that the
notice provided was not reasonable. The ultimate decision is then left in the hands of the
judge to decide whether such notice is reasonable or not. Thus, reasonable notice maybe 3
or 4 days or weeks or months depending on the circumstances and facts of each given case.
The flexibility of this provision is advantageous in emergency circumstances where a
notice period of 2-5 days may be deemed appropriate by the courts. The CBCA also
authorizes the court to make orders that the length of time be abridged or that the notice be
discarded.205 In the absence of such orders, the complainant will have to provide notice to
the directors in order to be able to bring a derivative action. It is important to note that prior
to 2001, the CBCA derivative action provision also required that “reasonable notice” be

203

Repeal and Re-enactment Bill 2017.
Section 344 of the Repeal and Re-enactment Bill.
205
See Section 239 (2) (a) of the CBCA.
204

49

given to the directors. However, this provision was amended in 2001 to include a specific
notice, i.e., 14 days’ notice.
2.3.4. Conditions Precedent to Bringing Derivative Actions
The CBCA sets out three prerequisites that the complainant must satisfy before an
application for leave to commence a derivative action will be granted by the court. These
include showing that the complainant has given at least 14 days’ notice to the directors of
the corporation or its affiliates of his intention to bring an action; that he is acting in good
faith; and that he is also acting in the best interest of the corporation or its affiliates as the
case may be. Nigerian corporate law provides that the applicant must satisfy four
prerequisites. In addition to the three prerequisites listed under Canadian corporate law, the
Nigerian corporate law provides that the applicant must also show that the wrongdoers are
the directors who are in control and will not take the necessary steps. 206 This also means
that the directors are the only proper defendants in a Nigerian derivative action, as the
applicant has to show that the erring party is the director (s) and not the dominant
shareholders. This is not the case under the CBCA. Thus, the Nigerian corporate law
provides more prerequisites that an applicant must satisfy than the equivalent CBCA
provision and so leaves the applicant with a more difficult task to face in order to obtain
the remedy from the Nigerian courts.
Also, the Nigerian derivative action provision narrows down the proper defendants to only
the directors of the company which may be a serious hindrance for the adequate protection
for minority shareholders. For instance, if the majority shareholders have voted for a certain
decision that the minority shareholders believe is detrimental to the corporation, the
minority shareholders may be unable to bring a derivative action on behalf of the
corporation, subject to the discretion of the court on the basis that the directors are not the
wrongdoers.
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Conclusion

The derivative action remedy is clearly a significant tool used in protecting the interests of
minority shareholders in a corporation. By instituting an action on behalf of the
corporation, minority shareholders are able to challenge decisions or actions taken by the
directors to the detriment of the business or affairs of the company or remedy any wrong
done to the corporation, irrespective of the historical rule in Foss v Harbottle. Although
this remedy is one tailored towards protecting the interests of the company, as highlighted
in this chapter, this remedy indirectly protects the rights of minority shareholders as well.
In fact, the derivative provisions under both jurisdictions empower the courts to direct that
any amount adjudged payable by a defendant in the action be paid wholly or in part to the
applicant. The derivative action remedy provisions under Nigerian and Canadian corporate
law are to a large extent very similar mainly because both were derived from
recommendations made from the Jenkins Committee in relation to section 210 of the UK
Companies Act of 1948.207However, the Canadian corporate statute has broadened the
scope of its derivative action provisions and also provided more clarity. For example, the
derivative action provision under the CBCA explicitly allows a minority shareholder to
bring an action on behalf of the affiliate of the corporation in which it is a registered holder
of security, while the CAMA does not. The mode of application for a derivative action
under Canadian corporate law is also more flexible than what is applicable under the
Nigerian corporate law, as the Nigerian courts will dismiss any action not brought in a form
of an originating summons. The Canadian provision on derivative actions also appears to
provide more details as to the period of notice required to be provided to the directors
before instituting a derivative action, which is also not provided under the Nigerian
corporate law. Furthermore, the CBCA also provides fewer prerequisites to instituting a
derivative action than the Nigerian legal system, thereby reducing the hurdles that minority
shareholders will have to face before instituting a derivative action. The above highlighted
are features that the Nigerian policymakers and regulators can glean from Canadian
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corporate law in order to provide and enhance an adequate and expedient remedy for
minority shareholders who desire to rectify any wrong done to the corporation.
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Chapter 3: Comparative Analysis of the Oppression Remedy under
Nigerian and Canadian Corporate Law
Introduction

This chapter reviews the oppression remedy available under the Nigerian and Canadian
corporate statutes, so as to examine the extent to which the legal provisions adequately
protect minority shareholders in a corporation in each jurisdiction. This chapter also
highlights the differences between both corporate law regimes and analyses the impact
these differences have on minority shareholders’ protection in their respective
jurisdictions.
The oppression remedy is the most extensive and flexible remedy that is designed to
remedy wrongs done to individual shareholders or a class or group of shareholders of a
corporation. And so, it is only reasonable to examine its provisions and the interpretation
of the courts, in order to get a clear picture of how minority shareholders are protected in
a corporation.

3.

Remedy for Oppressive or Unfairly Prejudicial Conduct under Nigerian
Company Law

3.1. Introduction
The current oppression remedy is embodied in Section 310 – 312 of the CAMA. This
provision was enacted in response to the inadequacy of the oppression remedy provisions
available under the Nigerian Companies Act of 1968 (the “1968 Act”). Section 408 and
410 enable a shareholder to bring a petition to wind up the company on the ground that it
is just and equitable that the company be wound up. However, this is not a remedy that
many shareholders are willing to explore especially because it will bring the end to a
company that they have invested in, which is not usually their objective.208 In view of this,
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special provisions were made in the Companies Act 1968 to serve as an alternative to the
winding-up remedy.
Section 210 of the 1968 Act provided that an oppressed minority shareholder may apply
to the court for an order that the “court may deem fit”. This provision did not specifically
state the orders the court may give in such circumstances. This provision was a replica of
the UK Companies Act of 1948 and surprisingly, was adopted in Nigeria in 1968 when the
oppression remedy had already proved inadequate in England as a result of the strict
approach and interpretation of the provision by the English judiciary.209As a result of the
vagueness of the orders the court could make as a remedy, this provision seemed
inadequate as it continued to be linked with the liquidation of the company at the instance
of the oppressed minority – the very link that the legislators were trying to avoid in the
first place.210
In 1990, the Nigerian Law Reform Commission acknowledged the inadequacy of this
section and recommended a more comprehensive provision that would state the exact
powers of the court and accommodate both oppressive and unfairly prejudicial
conduct.211Hence, section 310 – 312 of CAMA 2004 provides for relief that may be made
on the ground that the affairs of the company are being conducted in an oppressive or
unfairly prejudicial manner or that the interests of the shareholders are unfairly
disregarded.
3.1.1. Persons Entitled to bring an Application under Section 310-312 CAMA

The CAMA empowers the following persons to file a petition in court for relief on the
ground that the affairs of the company are being conducted in an illegal or oppressive or
unfairly prejudicial manner or in a manner that is unfairly discriminatory against them: 212
a) A member of the company;

209

Ibid.
Ibid.
211
See Nigerian Law Reform Commission "Working Papers on the Reform of Nigerian Company Law Vol.
I - Review and Recommendations” (Lagos: Nigerian Law Reform Commission, 1989).
212
Section 310 of the CAMA.
210

54

b) A director or officer or former director or officer of the company;
c) A creditor;
d) The Corporate Affairs Commission; or
e) Any other person who, in the discretion of the court, is the proper person to
make an application.
The CAMA defines a “member” of a company limited by shares as a person who has at
least one share in the company and who agreed in writing to become a member and has
his name entered into the register of members. 213 Thus, a member includes a minority
shareholder of a corporation irrespective of the value of shares he has. It is also important
to note that for the purpose of this remedy, the word “member” is defined to include the
personal representatives of a deceased person and any person to whom shares have been
transferred or transmitted by operation of law. In line with the objectives of this thesis, the
focus will be on the relief sought by members of the company or by the Corporate Affairs
Commission (“CAC”) on behalf of members of the company.
3.1.2. Grounds for Application

The grounds for seeking an oppression remedy under CAMA are as follows:
i)

that the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner that is
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against, a
member or members, or in a manner that is in disregard of the interests of a
member or the members as a whole or any person authorized to bring an action
under the section;214 or

ii)

that an act or omission or a proposed act or omission, by or on behalf of the
company or a resolution, or a proposed resolution, of a class of members, was
or would be oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory
against, a member or was or would be in a manner which is in disregard of the
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interests of a member or the members as a whole or any person authorized to
bring an action under the section.215
In view of the voting method that occurs in companies, i.e. the one share - one vote system,
this provision is designed to protect minority shareholders whose interests or rights may
be violated because they lack the voting power required to direct the resolutions of the
company in their favor or to protect their interests. Thus, in such instances where their
status as minority shareholders has put them in a precarious position, the law steps in to
protect them by empowering them to bring an application under the above-listed grounds.
The CAC may also institute an oppression action on the ground that:
(i)

the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner that is oppressive
or unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against a member or
members or in a manner which is in disregard of the public interest; or

(ii)

any actual or proposed act or omission of the company (including an act or
omission on its behalf) which was or would be oppressive, or unfairly
prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against a member or members in a
manner which is in disregard of the public interests. 216

This provision is designed to protect both members of a company and members of the
public at large. For instance, an oppressed minority shareholder (s) who does not have the
resources to bring an action in court or for any other reason may request the CAC to
institute an action on behalf of the oppressed minority shareholders. The CAC may also on
its own volition bring an action against a company on the ground that it disregards the
interest of the public. However, it is surprising that despite the extremely broad powers of
the CAC to seek redress for oppressed minority shareholders and the public, this power has
remained unutilized by the CAC. 217 Perhaps, many minority shareholders do not request
for such interference as a result of the lack of trust in the expertise of the CAC to adequately
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protect their interests. Thus, most cases in which relief for oppression is sought have been
instituted at the instance of minority shareholders and not the CAC. 218
3.1.3. Definition of Oppressive or Unfairly Prejudicial Conduct
The CAMA does not define or provide guidance on what will constitute an “oppressive” or
“unfairly prejudicial” conduct or an act that will be seen as disregarding the interests of a
minority shareholder. Therefore, recourse must be made to the interpretation provided by
the Nigerian courts. In this regard, the Nigerian courts have to a large extent relied on the
judicial interpretation by English courts of the terms “oppression” and “unfair prejudice”
in relation to section 210 of the UK Companies Act of 1948 which was the section
corresponding to section 210 of the Nigerian Companies Act 1968.
The English Court of Appeal in Re Jermyn Street Turkish Baths Ltd219 (which is still a valid
persuasive authority in Nigeria) defined “oppression” as follows:
Oppression occurs when shareholders having a dominant position in a company,
either (i) exercise that power to procure that something is done or not done in
the conduct of the company’s affairs or (ii) procure by an express or implicit
threat of an exercise of that power that something is not done in the conduct of
the company’s affairs, and when such conduct is unfair, burdensome, harsh and
wrongful to the other members of the company or some of them, and lacks the
degree of probity which they are entitled to expect in the conduct of the
company’s affairs.
In line with the above judicial interpretation, in Ogunade v Mobile Films (WA) Ltd,220
Kabiri Whyte J. explained the nature of oppressive acts in contemplation of Section 210 of
the Nigerian Companies Act 1968. He noted that “the oppression or fraudulent conduct of
the majority must be harsh, burdensome and wrongful” 221 and must represent a consistent
pattern of conduct intentionally directed at the oppressed minority over a period of time.
The court further stated that negligence in conducting the affairs of a company, or lack of
business ability or inefficiency will not be sufficient to make the court grant relief under
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Section 210 of the Nigerian Companies Act 1968.222 The problem with the explanation
ascribed to oppressive acts under Section 210 of the Nigerian Companies Act 1968 was the
need to establish that the oppressive conduct was a continuous pattern of conduct
intentionally directed to the oppressed shareholder. Hence, where minority shareholders’
rights have been violated by singular conduct, the court may not hold such to be
“oppressive” because it was not a continuous act. Therefore, the inclusion of the phrase
“unfairly prejudicial” by the legislators in Section 311 of the CAMA was a great move from
a restrictive to a broader approach, thereby enabling the court to be more flexible in
interpreting the term to adequately protect minority shareholders irrespective of whether
the act was continuous or singular conduct.223
Just like the word “oppression”, the CAMA also does not provide a definition of the phrase
“unfair prejudice” and, as such, recourse is to be made to the judicial interpretation of the
phrase. The court held in Re R.A Noble & Sons (Clothing) Ltd 224 that the test for unfairness
is objective and there is no need to show any conscious knowledge on the part of the
controller that it was unfair, or any other evidence of bad faith. The question would be
whether a reasonable bystander would regard the act or omission as unfairly
prejudicial.225An example of where the Nigerian court has granted this remedy was in a
circumstance where the minority shareholders alleged that the company had not held any
company meeting or filed annual returns with the CAC years after the company was
incorporated. The minority shareholders also alleged that the company was being run by
the majority shareholders leaving them in the dark as regards the financial status of the
company. The court held that this was a clear case where section 311 of CAMA could be
invoked as a basis of action. 226 The basis upon which the court decided that section 311
applies was not clearly stated, neither was there any analysis as to the factors the courts
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should look out for in deciding whether such act is oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or
unfairly disregards the rights of the shareholder.
In Aero Bell Nig Ltd v Fidelity Union Merchant Bank Ltd,227 the court had to decide whether
the act of declaring a lower dividend than previously declared by the board amounted to
unfair prejudice to the plaintiffs (who were former shareholders). The court held that the
plaintiffs were entitled to bring an action for relief from unfairly prejudicial conduct
regardless of the fact that they had sold their shares. This was because the unpaid dividend
had accrued before the sale of their shares was consummated. Again, the court did not give
any analysis or guideline that it followed in reaching this decision. In the words of the
court, the petitioners had amply demonstrated that they were entitled to dividends due to
them as at the date of the board meeting and not the dividends subsequently pronounced. 228
Perhaps the court based its decision on the reasonable expectation that the former
shareholders had that they would receive a certain dividend and then such expectations
were dashed by the declaration of another dividend. Even if this were the basis upon which
the court decided this case, it was not clearly stated.
The question that arises is whether there is a certain kind of harm or impact of such acts
that should be present before the court would apply section 311. Or are the courts more
likely to apply section 311 where the act is one that relates to the returns of investments of
the shareholders in the company? In the face of the broad statutory language, the Nigerian
courts have yet to establish clear cut rules to determine when an oppressive and unfairly
prejudicial act has occurred. It appears that prevailing in the case of genuinely “oppressive
acts” is easy since “oppression” “connotes harsh and wrongful acts that affect the rights of
the shareholders”.229 However, with respect to “unfairly prejudicial” acts, the term
comprises a broad range of corporate misconducts which are dependent on whether the
court is of the opinion that such acts qualify as “unfair prejudice”. This then leads to a
situation whereby shareholders who intend to bring an action under section 311 of the
CAMA are uncertain about the likely decision of the court since there are no judicial
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precedents setting out guidelines which the courts follow in reaching such judgments. This
uncertainty may operate to discourage minority shareholders to use this right which
eventually also decreases the likelihood that dominant shareholders and directors will have
appropriate incentives to respect minority shareholders’ rights. 230 Perhaps a more specific
legislative reform or clear guidelines formulated by the courts will address this problem.
However, legislative reform setting out factors to guide the court may still not capture every
circumstance especially in view of the broad nature of corporate misconducts; however,
guidelines established by the courts may be revised upon reviewing the facts of each case
as the need arises.
3.2.

Relief by the court

Where the court is satisfied that a petition under Section 310 and 311 of CAMA is wellfounded, it may make such order or orders as it thinks fit to bring relief in respect of the
matter complained of. The court could make an order as serious as one for winding up of
the company or directing that the company institute a specific proceeding or that the CAC
carries out an investigation on the company. For most minority shareholders, winding up
the company or exposing it to investigation by the CAC is not their objective. Rather they
wish to obtain a remedy or prevent any breach of their rights that could result in a
depreciation of their investments. Some other orders that the court is empowered to make
which may be of more interest to minority shareholders are as follows:
a)

an order regulating the conduct of the affairs of the company in the future;

b)

for the purchase of the shares of any member by other members of the
company;

c)

for the purchase of the shares of any member by the company and for the
reduction accordingly of the company’s capital;

d)

varying or setting aside a transaction or contract to which the company is a
party and compensating the company or any other party to the transaction or
contract;
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e)

restraining a person from engaging in specific conduct or from doing a specific
act or thing; or

f)

requiring a person to do a specific act or thing.

The wording of the CAMA implies that the courts have the discretion to determine what
remedies to provide the applicant and hence does not give the applicant the right to a
specific remedy.
The oppression remedy is one of the broadest remedies available for minority shareholders
under the Nigerian corporate law system. With the inclusion of the words “unfair prejudice,
disregard” and “discriminatory” in its provisions, it ensures that minority shareholders can
bring an application for this remedy at the slightest violation of their legal rights or
interests. Unlike the derivative action, this provision does not set out prerequisites to be
fulfilled before instituting an action before the court. Upon assessing the application, the
court is empowered to make a wide range of orders, including an order restraining a
corporation from engaging in specific conduct or requiring that a corporation does a
specific thing in order to remedy a wrong done to the minority shareholders in the company.
However, there are no set out guidelines that can help applicants determine how the court
will arrive at its conclusion or what specific orders the court will deem fit in any individual
case and thus this remedy is to a large extent entirely within the discretion of the court.
3.3. The Oppression Remedy under Canadian Corporate Law

The oppression remedy has been described as one of the remedies under Canadian
corporate law that gives the court extensive powers to redress all forms of unfair and
oppressive actions by corporations and their directors to minority shareholders.231 It is a
“flexible, far-reaching remedy”232 that allows any form of corporate behavior to be subject
to judicial scrutiny. 233It is an equitable remedy that seeks to ensure fairness to the minority
shareholders, irrespective of their shareholding and voting powers in the corporation. 234In
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examining whether a conduct is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial, or unfairly disregards
the interests of the shareholder, the courts may ignore the strict legal or statutory rights of
the parties and the limits on those rights, in order to reach a fair judgment. 235As aptly stated
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Re BCE:236
The oppression remedy focuses on harm to the legal and equitable
interests of a wide range of stakeholders affected by oppressive acts
of a corporation or its directors. This remedy gives a court a broad
jurisdiction to enforce not just what is legal but what is fair.
Oppression is also fact-specific: what is just and equitable is judged
by the reasonable expectations of the stakeholders in the context and
in regard to the relationships at play.
The oppression remedy available under the CBCA was modeled after Section 210 of the
UK Companies Act 1948 in accordance with the recommendations in the Dickerson
Report. However, the members of the Dickerson committee went beyond the original
English provision by addressing the weaknesses in the UK oppression remedy that had
been identified by the Jenkins Committee.237
Section 241 of the CBCA, reflecting the features recommended by the Dickerson
committee, provides as follows:
A complainant may apply to a court for an order under the section. If the court is
satisfied that in respect of a corporation or any of its affiliates:
(a)

any act or omission of the corporation or any of its affiliates effects a result;

(b)

the business or affairs of the corporation or any of its affiliates are or have been
carried on or conducted in a manner, or

(c)

the powers of the directors of the corporation or any of its affiliates are or have
been exercised in a manner.
that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the interests
of any security holder, creditor, director or officer, the court may make an order to
rectify the matters complained of.
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Simply put, a complainant may seek an oppression remedy on any of the above-listed
grounds, which will be examined in the latter part of this chapter.
3.3.1. Who may bring an Oppression Action?

Just as in the case of derivative actions, section 241 of the CBCA statutorily empowers a
complainant to bring an action seeking this remedy. As noted above, section 238 of the
CBCA defines a “complainant” to include: (a) a registered or beneficial owner and a former
registered holder or beneficial owner, of a security of a corporation and any of its affiliates;
(b) a director or an officer or a former director or officer of a corporation or any affiliates;
(c) the CBCA Director; or (d) any other person who in the discretion of the court is a proper
person to make an application under the section.
3.3.2. Grounds under which Oppression Remedy may be sought

a)

“A corporate act or omission effects a result…”
Section 241 (2) (a) of the CBCA provides that a complainant may bring an action for
an oppression remedy where the corporation’s act or omission effects a result. Thus,
it is not enough to show that the corporation has acted or omitted to do something;
the complainant must also show that such acts or omission resulted in an outcome
that is oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregards the interests of the
complainant.238

b)

“The business or affairs of the corporation or any of its affiliates are or
have been carried on…”
Section 2 (1) of the CBCA defines “affairs” as the relationship among a corporation,
its affiliates, shareholders, directors, and officers. The wording of Section 241 (2)
provides for “business or affairs”, which means that a shareholder can seek an
oppression remedy relating to all decisions of a corporation whether relating to the
business of the corporation or the relationship among the corporation, affiliates,
shareholders, and officers. This remedy will not be applicable, however, where for
instance, the personal action of a director is not one that relates to the company’s
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business or affairs or an exercise of his power as a director. In such instances where
it relates to the personal action of the directors or where it is outside the scope of the
affairs or business of the corporation, the court will not qualify it as a ground to seek
an oppression remedy. 239
c) “The director's powers are exercised …”
Section 241 (2) c of the CBCA provides that a complainant may institute an action
under this provision where the powers of the directors are exercised in a manner that
is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly disregards the interest of, the
complainant. It is important to note even though the directors may have complied
with their statutory powers, a complainant may still bring an oppression remedy
without it affecting the complainant’s chance of obtaining the remedy, or precluding
the judge from granting the remedy. 240Most of the oppression cases usually arise from
this ground, because of the wide statutory and fiduciary duties directors owe to the
corporation.241For instance, section 122 of the CBCA provides that “every director
and officer of a corporation in exercising their powers and discharging their duties
shall act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation;
and exercise the care, diligence, and skill that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise in comparable circumstances.” It is usually in the exercise of the director’s
powers that they may breach their fiduciary duty, which is a ground for an affected
minority shareholder to bring an oppression claim to the courts. 242
3.3.3. Interests protected by the Oppression Remedy

No doubt the oppression remedy is widely resorted to when seeking protection for
minority shareholders who may have been oppressed, unfairly prejudiced or had their
interests unfairly disregarded. However, as wide as it may seem, this remedy does not
cover every type of interest of the shareholders. In order to be protected by this remedy, a
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minority shareholder must show that his affected interests qualify as “reasonable
expectations” and that these reasonable expectations were thwarted in a way that
constitutes oppression, unfair prejudice or unfair disregard of those interests. 243
The Supreme Court of Canada in Re BCE244 set out the factors to consider in an oppression
suit. In this case, there was a plan of arrangement put in place for the purchase of the shares
of BCE Inc. (“BCE”) by a consortium of purchasers by way of a leveraged buyout. The
arrangement was opposed by a group of debenture holders who complained that the trading
value of their debentures would diminish by an average of 20% while conferring a premium
of approximately 40% on the market price of BCE shares. In addressing the issues raised
in this case, the Supreme Court set out a two-pronged test 245 for determining whether a
claim of oppression is made out by the complainant. The court stated as follows:
In assessing a claim of oppression, a court must answer two questions: (1)
Does the evidence support the reasonable expectation asserted by the
claimant? and (2) Does the evidence establish that the reasonable
expectation was violated by conduct falling within the terms “oppression”,
“unfair prejudice” or “unfair disregard” of a relevant interest? 246
The sub-sections below will shed more light on the two-pronged tests carried out by the
court to determine whether the oppression remedy will be available to a complainant.
3.3.3.1. The Reasonable Expectations Test
This then leads to the question – what is a reasonable expectations test? Although this
phrase is not defined in the CBCA, according to the courts, the reasonable expectations
test propounds that a complainant who may be a shareholder must show that the conduct
being claimed as oppressive falls short of his reasonable expectations in relation to his
investments in the corporation.
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In Westfair Foods Ltd v Watt,247 the court explained what amounts to “reasonable
expectations”:
In very general terms, one clear principle that emerges is that we regulate
voluntary relationships by regard to the expectations raised in the mind of a
party, by the word or deed of the other, and which the first party ordinarily
would realize it was encouraging by its words and deeds. This is what we
call reasonable expectations, deserving of protection.
This test is in line with the fundamental principles of corporate law that a minority
shareholder expects that the directors and officers will comply with their statutory duties
which may include maximizing profits and share value in order to meet the expectation of
the shareholder.248 The courts recognize that a corporation is an entity that encompasses
various individuals and groups whose rights and interests may conflict 249and as such, it has
been said that the oppression remedy will only avail shareholders where their reasonable
expectations are not met and this would not include a “wish list” of the shareholder.250
These “reasonable expectations” also include expectations that may have been created by
the management of the corporation, whether legally binding or not. The court will usually
apply an objective test to determine whether a reasonable expectation has been founded on
the facts of the particular case. 251
The Supreme Court in Re BCE identified some factors that may guide a court in assessing
whether or not a reasonable expectation has been founded on the facts of a given case.
Thus, what is a reasonable expectation may depend on the following: (a) standard
commercial practice; (b) size, nature and structure of the corporation; (c) relationships
between the parties; (d) past practice of the corporation; (e) steps that the claimant could
have taken to protect himself or herself; (f) provisions of a shareholders’ agreement or
other documents. 252The Court found on the facts in that case that the expectation of the
debentureholders that the directors would consider their position while making their
decision was reasonable and had been met considering that the Board examined all its
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options and acted in what it perceived to be in the best interests of the corporation. 253 The
Court noted that the debentureholders were not contending merely for a reasonable
expectation that the Board consider their interests, but rather for an expectation that the
Board preserve the market value of the debentures. And on this note, the court held that the
reasonable expectations that the Board consider their interests were met and asking for
anything more than this was outside the confines of the reasonable expectation test. As
such, the oppression remedy available under section 241 of the CBCA did not apply. It is
important to note that the list of factors relating to reasonable expectations referred to by
the Supreme Court in BCE is not exhaustive, and as such, the scope of the oppression
remedy continues to expand within the Canadian corporate law jurisprudence, thereby
making it an indispensable tool in the hands of litigators seeking remedies for minority
shareholders. 254
Another case where the court applied the “reasonable expectations” test was Downtown
Eatery (1993) Ltd v Ontario,255where the plaintiff who was an employee of B Inc. had
obtained judgment for damages for wrongful dismissal. Several years after the action was
commenced there was a major reorganization of B Inc. with another company, D. Ltd. B
Inc. and D Ltd. were related companies, and directors of B Inc. were also directors of D
Ltd. The directors did not believe the plaintiff had a meritorious claim and claimed they
did not reorganize to avoid judgment and so the judgment against B Inc. remained
unsatisfied. The plaintiff then sued all of the companies in the group basing his claim, in
part on the oppression remedy. At trial, the application was dismissed on the basis that
since the amalgamation and reorganization were not undertaken for the purpose of
defeating the plaintiff’s judgment, the employee was not entitled to an oppression remedy.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal overturned the decision of the trial court and held that the
intention of depriving the employee of judgment was not a prerequisite for an oppression
remedy. The employee had reasonable expectations that the employer’s affairs would be
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conducted with a view to protecting his interests and the effect of the amalgamation was
unfairly prejudicial and unfairly disregarded the employee’s interests. 256
From the above-reported cases, it is clear that the test adopted by the court in determining
reasonable expectations is an objective one which also requires a balancing of the
competing rights and interests of the stakeholders in the corporation in arriving at a
decision. However, proof that reasonable expectations have not been met is not enough to
avail a complainant the remedy under section 241. The court will further examine whether
the violation of such reasonable expectations results in one of the statutory elements which
will be examined below.
3.3.3.2 Oppression, Unfairly prejudicial or Unfairly Disregards interests

The court in Re BCE went on to note that the complainant must also show that the breach
of the reasonable expectation caused harm in such a way as to meet one of the statutory
components in Section 241 (2) of the CBCA, that is, oppression, unfair prejudice or unfair
disregard. It is important to note that not every breach of reasonable expectations would
amount to oppression, unfair disregard or unfair prejudice. 257 While the first step –
“reasonable expectations” - appears to be unambiguous in light of the factors listed and the
test adopted by the courts in the above-reported cases, questions arise as to the type of harm
or kinds of actions that would amount to oppression, unfair prejudice or unfair disregard
of the rights of the complainants. Although some judges lump the interpretation or
consequences of all three situations together for the sake of convenience, it is clear from
the wording of Section 241 that each of these possibilities represents a separate cause of
action.258It is then important to examine the kinds of behavior that would be characterized
as oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct or conduct disregarding the interests of
minority shareholders in a corporation.
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In the case of Scottish Cooperative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer,259“oppressive” conduct
has been defined as “burdensome, harsh or wrongful”. The definition of “oppressive
conduct” that appears to be most cited by the Canadian courts and in legal writings is that
provided by Lord Cooper in Elder v Elder & Watson Ltd, 260 where he noted that for a
conduct to be qualified as oppressive, it should at the “lowest involve a visible departure
from the standards of fair dealing and a violation of the conditions of fair play on which
every shareholder who entrusts his money to a company is entitled to rely.” A minority
shareholder who has invested funds will have certain expectations. For instance, such
shareholder will expect to receive notice of meetings of the members of the corporation
and be able to vote on resolutions arising from such meetings, amongst other things. Now,
where the directors or certain controlling shareholders violate these minority shareholder’s
basic rights, the court will likely hold such conduct to be oppressive. 261
The phrase “unfairly prejudicial” has been taken to mean “acts that are unjustly or
inequitably detrimental”, 262 and is usually viewed as less offensive than oppressive acts.
The test for whether a conduct is unfairly prejudicial to the rights of a minority shareholder
is an objective test, whereby a reasonable bystander observing the conduct of the
controlling shareholders or directors of the corporation would regard the conduct as having
unfairly prejudiced the interests of the minority shareholder. 263 Some examples of unfairly
prejudicial conduct include squeezing out a minority shareholder, paying dividends
without a formal declaration, failing to disclose related party transactions and changing
corporate structure to drastically alter debt ratios. 264
“Unfair disregard” has been viewed as the least serious of the three wrongs referred to in
Section 241 of the CBCA. This has been interpreted to mean “unjustly without cause, pay
no attention to, ignore or treat as of no importance the interests of the shareholder.” 265 It is
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important to note that such disregard must be “unfair”, as a mere disregard of a minority
shareholder’s rights will not suffice.266 This is because it is not unusual for corporate
directors to treat the interests of one group of shareholders as more important than minority
shareholders. But in doing so, they must strike a fair balance between the interests of
various shareholders, including the minority shareholders’ interests.267In the case of
Grigoriu v Ottawa-Carleton Standard Condominium Corp No 706, 268a condominium
corporation amended its declaration to prohibit the use of parking units by non-residents.
The purpose of this amendment was to address security concerns caused by non-residents
accessing the parking garage. This change adversely affected the rights of the applicant
who owned a parking unit and a residential unit in a neighbouring condominium
corporation and was unable to sell his residential condominium unit (in the neighbouring
corporation) because he was unable to sell his parking unit along with it. The judge hearing
the application found that the amendment to the declaration breached the owner's
reasonable expectation of being able to sell his residential unit with his parking unit and
that the Board unfairly disregarded the interests of the applicant. It is pertinent to note that
these statutory components and interpretations provided by the courts are merely
illustrative and should not be regarded as “watertight compartments” as they often “overlap
and intermingle”. 269
Unlike Nigerian courts, the Canadian courts provide some context (that is the two-pronged
test articulated in Re BCE) as to how the court decides on whether Section 241 of CBCA
will be applied. However, it has been said that with respect to the second stage of the test,
there is not much analytical clarity as to how the courts arrive at these decisions. 270 This is
because unlike with the first prong of the test, the Supreme Court has yet to establish factors
or guidelines or even requirements that should be met in determining whether the violation
of reasonable expectations resulted in an oppression, unfair prejudice or unfair disregard
of the interests of the complainant. This has left the lower courts a gap to fill in and could
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then create some level of uncertainty in deciding oppression cases. In the case of Scullion
v Munro,271for example, the plaintiff and Munro incorporated three companies together and
were equal partners throughout the time in their business together. Munro, the defendant,
alleged that the plaintiff made improper payments to himself over several years and as a
result decided to end business with the plaintiff. Munro proceeded to remove the plaintiff’s
personal belongings from the companies, denied him access to the companies and stopped
paying his salary. The court held that the effect of Munro’s conduct was unfairly prejudicial
to the plaintiff and he was entitled to relief pursuant to the oppression remedy. Although
the court made mention of the case of Re BCE, it did not apply the two-pronged test nor
did it provide an analysis of why the conduct amounted to unfair prejudice to the plaintiff’s
interests. By applying an objective test, it is easy to see that there was a breach by Munro
of the plaintiff’s reasonable expectations since the plaintiff was deprived of his financial
benefit and access to the companies. However, with respect to the second prong of the test,
it seems as though this is usually decided based on judicial precedents (where there are
similar circumstances) or in the discretion of the courts, seeing that the courts do not
provide any analysis that helps all parties understand whether the statutory components set
out in the CBCA were met.272
Unlike the first prong of the test where Canadian courts have set out an analysis and
guidelines on how to arrive at whether or not the reasonable expectations of a shareholder
have been violated,273 Canadian courts do not appear to do the same with the second prong
of the test. The courts simply assert that certain actions or omissions are, or are not,
oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregarding the interests of the applicant,
without articulating principles that inform their conclusion. As a result, there seems to be
a level of uncertainty about what specific acts the courts will regard as oppressive, unfairly
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prejudicial or unfairly disregarding the interests of the shareholder since there are no laid
down principles.274
In a more recent case –Wilson v Alharayeri275- the CEO of the corporation who was also a
shareholder, resigned when it was revealed that he failed to disclose a conflict of interest
he had with the company. In response to the corporation’s financial difficulties, the board
decided to complete a private placement to its existing common shareholders. Two of the
directors advocated against converting the previous CEO’s shares on the basis of his
conduct as the CEO. As a result of the private placement, issuing securities, the value of
the CEO’s shares was greatly reduced, and the control of the two current directors was
increased. The CEO then filed an application for oppression under section 241 of the
CBCA. The court held that section 241 was applicable in this circumstance and that the two
directors were personally liable for the oppressive conduct. The court set out four general
principles that should guide the courts in determining whether to grant the remedy. First,
the oppression remedy must in itself be a fair way of dealing with the situation. It seems
fair to hold the two directors personally liable being that they had derived a personal benefit
in the form of increased control of the corporation, and misused their corporate power by
reducing the value of the previous CEO’s shares. Second, an order given by the courts
should go no further than is necessary to rectify the oppression. Third, any order may serve
only to vindicate the reasonable expectations of security holders, creditors, directors or
officers in their capacity as corporate stakeholders. And fourth, a court should consider the
general corporate law context in exercising its remedial discretion.
It is important to note that the above guidelines regulate the discretionary powers of the
court with respect to section 241 (3) of the CBCA, that is the orders the court can grant
having established that section 241 (1) of the CBCA applies. However, the second prong
of the test remains fact-specific and is very dependent on judicial discretion. Even though
this is a common pattern among other equitable remedies provided by the court, providing
guidelines with respect to the second prong of the test, just as in the first prong of the test,
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will help in strengthening minority shareholders’ protection. For instance, a minority
shareholder is best protected where both directors and majority shareholders understand
that certain conducts determined in accordance with clear principles and analysis laid down
by the courts will amount to oppression, unfair prejudice or unfair disregard of the interests
of the complainant and not based merely on whether a judge in a particular case might
think so.
Upon examining oppression remedy cases in Alberta, British Columbia and Ontario
between 2015 and 2017 Girgis276 advises that two tests should be adopted with respect to
the second prong of the test. First, the complainant must experience harm in its corporate
role, arising from its relationship with the corporation, and the harm must be particular to
the complainant’s interests and, secondly, other remedies cannot be capable of addressing
the harm. Perhaps, it might also be beneficial to include in the test the existence of any
harm negatively affecting the returns of the investments of a shareholder since that is the
primary purpose of most investors who buy shares in a corporation. Even if these guidelines
were officially established by the court, just like the “reasonable expectations” test, they
would not constitute an exhaustive list of considerations but could nevertheless provide
some level of clarity for complainants and restrict the exercise of discretion of the courts
and create some level of certainty which is essential for a corporate law system that aims
to adequately protect its minority shareholders’ rights and interests.
3.4.

Remedies of the Court

Where the complainant succeeds in satisfying the court that his interest is a “reasonable
expectation” and that such interest has been violated in a way that constitutes oppression
or unfair prejudice or unfair disregard, the court may then make an order to rectify the
situation complained of. Section 241 (3) bestows very wide discretionary powers on the
court to address these wrongs, as the very essence of the oppression remedy is to remedy
any wrongs done to the complainant, not to decree punishment against the wrongdoers. In
the words of Farley J, “[t]he job for the court is to even up the balance, not tip it in favour
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of the hurt party”.277The CBCA, just like CAMA, authorizes the court to make such orders
as it deems fit. The Canadian corporate law, however, sets out in more specific terms the
kinds of orders the court may make. For example, the court may make an order requiring
a corporation to produce to the court or interested person financial statements in a form
prescribed by the CBCA or the court.278 The court may also order that the affairs of the
corporation be regulated by amending the articles or by-laws or creating or amending a
unanimous shareholder agreement. 279 In addition to the orders set out under Nigerian
corporate law, the CBCA also authorizes the court to make the following orders:
a) an order directing an issue or exchange of securities;
b) an order appointing directors in place of or in addition to all or any of the
directors then in office;
c) an order directing a corporation or any other person, to pay a security holder
any part of the monies that the security holder paid for securities, provided that
the company has the financial capability and would not, as a consequence of
such payment of monies to a security holder, become insolvent thereafter;
d) an order compensating an aggrieved person;
e) an order directing rectification of the registers or other records of the
corporation; and
f) an order requiring the trial of any issue.
The broadness and flexibility of the Canadian oppression remedy make it a necessary tool
in protecting minority shareholders in a corporation. This is so because the CBCA gives the
courts unlimited powers to redress all sorts of unfairness and oppressive actions, whether
legal or equitable. Commenting on the flexibility of this remedy, S.M Beck 280 described the
Canadian oppression remedy as “the broadest, most comprehensive and most open-ended
shareholder remedy in the common law world.” 281 This can be seen in Section 241 (3) of
the CBCA which allows the court to grant any order it deems fit to rectify the matters
complained of.
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3.5. Comparative Analysis of the Nigerian and Canadian Oppression Remedy

This section will conduct a comparative analysis of the oppression remedy available under
the CAMA and CBCA. Although most of the oppression remedy provisions of both
jurisdictions are very similar, there are certain differences that are worth highlighting. For
instance, while the CAMA permits members and other stakeholders to commence an
oppression remedy action only against the corporation, its directors or officers, the CBCA
permits members of the corporation to bring such action against the corporation, its,
directors and officers, and any of its affiliates. Also, the CAMA makes provision for
anticipatory oppression such that an applicant can institute an oppression remedy action
for a proposed act or omission. The CBCA, on the other hand, does not have this provision.
Another significant difference between the two legal systems is the interpretation adopted
by the courts in the respective jurisdictions. While the Canadian courts have set out detailed
guidelines that the courts take into consideration in deciding an oppression remedy case,
the Nigerian courts have yet to lay down any form of guideline to help all parties decide
whether the oppression remedy will apply. For example, the Canadian courts have adopted
the use of the reasonable expectations test in deciding whether an act or omission is
oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregarding of the interests of the complainant,
while the Nigerian courts have no expressly set out test that can assist parties decide how
the courts will exercise this discretionary power.
3.5.1. Proper Parties to Seek the Oppression Remedy

Just as under the derivative action provision, section 241 of the CBCA empowers a
complainant to seek the oppression remedy with respect to acts or omissions by the
affiliates of the corporation in which it is a registered or beneficial holder of a security. 282
The CAMA, on the other hand, does not explicitly provide for such powers that will allow
an applicant to institute this remedy against an affiliate of the corporation of which it is a
registered holder of a security unless the court uses its discretion to allow such action.283
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The recent Bill passed by the House of Senate which extends the application of the Nigerian
derivative action to affiliates does not include similar changes to the oppression remedy
provision. The reason for permitting such recourse under the derivative action provision
and not yet under the oppression remedy is not clear. Perhaps, it is an omission by the
legislators, as there seems to be no reasonable reason why this provision should not also
be extended to cover affiliates of the corporations in which the shareholder is a registered
holder of securities. The implication of this is that the court may prevent shareholders from
applying for this remedy in relation to acts or omissions of an affiliate of the corporation
in which it is a shareholder because of the strict adherence to its locus standi principle.284
In doing so, this may be prejudicial to the personal rights of minority shareholders
especially in instances where the supposed affiliate is the financial backbone of the
corporation and minority shareholders are unable to bring an application against the
directors where they have mismanaged its funds.
3.5.2. Anticipatory Oppression Suits

An interesting point under the Nigerian oppression remedy is that its provision allows an
applicant to seek relief for anticipatory or threatened oppression. The CAMA provides that
an applicant can seek this remedy for a proposed act or omission or resolution that would
be oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or discriminatory against a member. 285 This
provision is put in place to prevent a violation of that minority shareholder’s rights, such
that they can seek this remedy even when their rights are yet to be violated, but when they
understand such imminent act or omission or resolution will amount to oppression or
disregard of their interests. The CBCA does not have any provision for anticipatory
oppression claims. 286In Sparling c. Javelin International Lte 287the court refused to make an
order because the matter complained of was an apprehension of future oppression. In
interpreting section 234 of the CBCA (now 241), the court noted that it was allowed to
“make orders to rectify the matters complained of and not to remedy injustices which have
284
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not yet occurred and which may never occur”.288 In other words, the Canadian courts (in
interpreting section 241 of the CBCA) are of the view that any order of rectification should
only address injustices which have occurred, not those that may only be feared as possibly
happening in the future. However, Morritt et al are of the view that where there are
reasonable grounds to believe that damage will occur if an order is not granted, the broad
statutory authority to grant oppression relief exists. 289
3.5.3. The Reasonable Expectation Rule

One of the significant developments of the Canadian oppression remedy is the adoption of
the reasonable expectations test. This is a device applied by the Canadian courts in
interpreting the oppression remedy provisions available under the CBCA and other
provincial corporate law statutes. The application of this test gives a wider approach to
protecting minority shareholders, such that clear bargains or expectations of parties to a
corporate contract or compact not found in the legal documents guiding contracting parties
can also be enforced. Also, the adoption of this test has to a great extent provided some
level of certainty for all actors in the Canadian corporate environment. This is because the
concept of the “reasonable expectations” test means that specific conduct can be found to
be oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregarding of interests only if it violates
the reasonable expectation of the complainant. In other words, a reasonable expectation
has to be established first before the courts will determine whether or not the oppression
remedy will avail the applicant.
The “reasonable expectations” test is a very important tool in light of the broadness of the
oppression remedy, such that it helps to narrow the applicability of the broad legislation
which may otherwise give rise to uncertainty, inconsistency, and confusion if care is not
taken. Also, this test is in line with the principles of corporate law that a minority
shareholder expects that the directors and officers will comply with their statutory duties
which may include maximizing profits and share value in order to meet the expectation of
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the shareholder.290This judicial tool is however not used by the Nigerian courts in deciding
whether the oppression remedy applies in a given case. In fact, there is yet to be any laid
down guidelines by the Nigerian courts in interpreting this extremely wide remedy. This
then leads to a clear case of uncertainty for all parties because no one can clearly understand
the basis upon which the courts may decide that the oppression remedy applies. It is even
possible that the Nigerian court may refuse to grant such remedy based on “judicial
discretion” even where the reasonable expectations of the applicant have been violated.
Therefore, it is recommended that the Nigerian courts adopt this test as it not only provides
certainty for the interpretation of the oppression remedy but also goes to support the
fundamental principles of corporate law.
Having highlighted the differences between the oppression remedy provided under each of
CAMA and the CBCA, it is clear that statutory provisions provided under the CAMA are
not significantly different from the oppression remedy provisions available under the
CBCA. However, the significant difference lies in the interpretation provided by the courts
under the respective jurisdictions. The Canadian courts set out more details and guidance
by adopting the reasonable expectations test in interpreting the oppression remedy
provision, while the Nigerian courts have no laid down guideline or test that assists in such
interpretation. While the oppression remedy provisions under both jurisdictions were
derived from section 210 of the U.K Companies Act 1948, the Canadian oppression remedy
has evolved to a higher level of sophistication by enlarging the scope of the remedy 291 and
setting out tests and factors that can help parties decide whether the reasonable expectations
of the applicant have been violated or not, so as to further determine whether the oppression
remedy applies. The Nigerian oppression remedy, on the other hand, still mirrors section
210 of the U.K Companies Act with slight changes and the Nigerian judiciary does not
provide any form of analysis that can provide some guidance on how the courts will
exercise their judicial discretion. No doubt, there is need for the Nigerian corporate system
to catch up with these “Canadian-inspired” changes and tests adopted by the Canadian
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courts, in order to provide more clarity for oppression remedy cases, and thereby improve
the minority shareholders’ protection regime. 292

Conclusion

As highlighted above, the oppression remedy is an equitable and far-reaching remedy that
allows the court to remedy any form of corporate wrong done to the minority shareholder.
It looks beyond the provisions set out in the statutes and ensures that shareholders are
adequately protected where an act or omission is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial or if such
act unfairly disregards the interest of the shareholder.
The oppression remedy provisions under both Nigerian and Canadian corporate law are very
similar in form; however, it appears that the Canadian corporate system allows for a more
extensive approach than the Nigerian legal system. For instance, while the CBCA allows a
shareholder to bring an application for an oppression remedy in respect of an act or omission
by the affiliate of the corporation, the CAMA does not explicitly do so. The CBCA also
provides more details on the grounds upon which an oppression remedy may be brought,
i.e., where the act effects a result or where the business or affairs of the corporation or
director’s powers are exercised in an oppressive manner.
The CAMA, on the other hand, provides that the remedy can be sought when the affairs or
act or omission or proposed resolution will amount to oppression. Aside from the few
differences between their legislation, a significant difference between both legal systems is
the broad interpretation given to this provision by Canadian courts. The introduction of the
concept of “reasonable expectations” by the courts in assessing these claims allows this
provision to accommodate more than just legal expectations but reasonable expectations
that could have been anticipated from the interaction among stakeholders of the corporation.
While the Nigerian courts may have applied this test in a number of cases, it is not one
clearly pronounced or set out as a standard for the Nigerian courts in deciding oppression
292
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cases. And therefore it is important that the Nigerian courts clearly pronounce this test and
guidelines to assist in determining whether an oppression remedy applies in any given case.
This will then provide a level of certainty for all parties, such that minority shareholders and
other stakeholders understand that certain acts may be declared a violation of the reasonable
expectations of the minority shareholder (s) or any other stakeholder, as the case may be.
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Chapter 4: Solving the Predicament
Introduction
The previous chapters set out a comparative analysis of minority shareholders' protection
(derivative action and oppression remedy) under Nigerian and Canadian corporate law. It
highlighted the flaws in the legislative provisions and judicial interpretations of both
remedies under the respective jurisdictions and concluded that some of the legal provisions
and rigid interpretations provided by the Nigerian courts compared to Canadian courts can
hinder the corporate law system from providing adequate protection for minority
shareholders in a Nigerian corporation. This chapter will summarize in table form, key
points of comparison between the derivative action and the oppression remedy under
Nigerian and Canadian corporate law regimes that have been identified in the previous
chapters.
Furthermore, this chapter concludes that there are not many significant differences in the
statutory provisions relating to the Nigerian and Canadian minority shareholders’
protection. Yet, there are different outcomes in the application of minority shareholders’
protection in both countries (with minority shareholders in Nigeria enjoying less
protection) because of different patterns of enforcement. Therefore, this chapter places
more emphasis on enforcement errors and systematic inefficiencies that could affect
minority shareholders’ protection under the Nigerian corporate law regime.

81

4.1. Derivative Action under Nigerian and Canadian Corporate law
The derivative action is embodied in 238 and 239 of the CBCA and section 309 and 303 of
the CAMA respectively, with both provisions being substantially similar. The table below
will summarize the differences between the provisions identified in the previous chapters.

S/N
CBCA
1.

CAMA

Section 238 of the CBCA lists the Section 309 of the CAMA lists the
categories of persons authorized to categories of persons authorized to
bring a derivative action. The CBCA bring a derivative action. Unlike the
authorizes

a

shareholder

of

a CBCA,

it

corporation or any of its affiliates to authorize

does
a

not

explicitly

shareholder

of

a

bring a derivative action on behalf of corporation to bring a derivative
a

corporation

or

any

of

its action on behalf of its affiliates and

subsidiaries.
2.

vice versa.

Section 248 of the CBCA provides Rule 2 (1) & (2) of the Companies
that a derivative action may be Proceedings Rules provides that all
commenced in a summary manner applications, including the derivative
but also leaves in the discretion of action

must

be

brought

by

the party seeking the remedy to originating summons. The Nigerian
proceed by way of action. Most courts have rejected applications not
importantly, the courts have also brought in this form.
pronounced that they will not set
aside the originating process on the
ground

of

wrong

mode

of

commencement.
3.

Section 239 (2) (a) of the CBCA The CAMA requires the applicant to
requires a complainant to show he show that he has given reasonable
has given notice of not less than 14 notice to the directors of his intention
days

to

the

directors

of

the to file an application for a derivative
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corporation informing them of his action on behalf of the company. The
intention of instituting a derivative CAMA does not define the term
action. The CBCA also allows the “reasonable notice”.
court to use its discretion where the
complainant is unable to give the
stipulated notice period.
4.

The

CBCA

sets

out

three The CAMA sets out 4 prerequisites

prerequisites that a complainant an applicant must satisfy before a
must

satisfy

before

leave

to leave to commence a derivative

commence a derivative action can be action can be granted by the court. In
granted

by

the

court.

The addition to the prerequisites provided

complainant must show that he has under the CBCA, the applicant is also
provided at least 14 days’ notice to required to show that the wrong
the directors, that he is acting in good doers are the directors who are in
faith and he is acting in the best control and will not take the
interest of the corporation.

necessary steps to sue. In other
words, this remedy may not cover
minority shareholders in cases where
the dominant shareholders are the
wrong doers.

4.1.1. Recommendations relating to the Nigerian derivative action
4.1.1.1. Party to Institute a derivative action

As highlighted in the second chapter of this thesis, the Companies and Allied Matters
(Repeal and Re-enactment) Bill which is yet to be made into law, allows shareholders of a
corporation to bring a derivative action on behalf of the subsidiary of the corporation.
Hopefully, this bill will be passed into law so that shareholders of a corporation can remedy
any wrong done to a subsidiary of the corporation in which it is a registered holder of a
security.
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4.1.1.2. Mode of Commencement of Derivative Action

The Nigerian Companies Proceeding Rules could be amended to allow the applicant to
decide the mode of commencement, so long as the conditions precedent for a derivative
action required under CAMA are fulfilled. The word “shall” used under Rule 2 (1) of the
Nigerian Companies Proceedings Rules should be amended to read “may” to imply that
the applicant has the discretion to bring an application for a derivative action in any other
mode. Furthermore, there is a need to also provide language similar to what is available
under Rule 2.01 (2) of the Ontario Civil Procedure Rules which provides that the “court
shall not set aside an originating process on the ground that the proceeding should have
been commenced by an originating process other than the one employed”.293 This will make
it very clear to the courts that the intention of the legislators is to eradicate such
unreasonable adherence to technicality. This will also enable the courts to adopt a flexible
approach just like the Canadian courts in interpreting the provisions of the Companies
Proceeding Rules. However, in the absence of such amendment (especially because the
Nigerian legislators do not turn around amendments frequently), the Nigerian courts should
overlook such technicality and adopt the more flexible approach of the Canadian courts, so
long as the non-compliance relates to the form and not the substance of the application.
4.1.1.3. Notice to Directors

It is recommended that the Nigerian legislature adopt the provision relating to the notice to
directors in the CBCA by setting out a specific notice period. It should also set out
provisions allowing the court to use its discretion in urgent situations where irreparable
damage may be done to the interests of the corporation if no derivative action is brought
before the mandatory notice period to directors required under the law.
4.1.1.4. Conditions Precedent to Bringing Derivative Actions

It is recommended that the additional condition in the CAMA which requires the applicant
to show that the wrongdoers are the directors, who are in control and will not take the
293
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necessary steps, 294 should be removed from the derivative action provisions under CAMA.
This is because it clearly connotes that the directors are the only proper defendants in a
Nigerian derivative action. However, there may be instances where the wrongdoers may
be the dominant shareholders and not the directors, or the wrongdoers maybe both the
directors and dominant shareholders. It is important that this provision be removed so as
not to create further restrictions on shareholders who want to institute a derivative action
on behalf of the corporation.
4.2.

Oppression Remedy under Nigerian and Canadian Corporate Law

The oppression remedy is set out in section 241 of the CBCA and section 310-312 of the
CAMA respectively. Just as with the derivative action, both provisions are very similar.
The table below will summarize the few key differences between the respective provisions
and the interpretations provided by the courts in the respective jurisdictions:
S/N

CBCA

CAMA

1.

Section 241 explicitly empowers a Section 311 of the CAMA does not
complainant to seek the oppression explicitly empower a member of a
remedy with respect to acts or corporation to seek an oppression
omission by the corporation or any of remedy against its affiliate and vice
its affiliates.

2.

versa.

The CBCA does not expressly Section 311 (2) of the CAMA allows an
provide for anticipatory oppressive applicant to bring an action for a
claims. In fact, the Canadian courts proposed act or omission that would be
are of the view that any order of oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or
rectification should only be made to discriminatory against the applicant.
address

injustices

which

have

occurred and not those feared to
possibly happen in the future.
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3.

In

determining

whether

an The reasonable expectations test is not

oppression remedy will be granted, applied in deciding oppression remedy
the Canadian courts have adopted the cases in Nigerian courts.
reasonable expectations test. The
application of the test offers broad
protection to shareholders, such that
clear bargains and even expectations
of parties not found in the legal
documents can be enforced by the
courts

on

the

basis

that

the

complainant reasonably expected
certain treatment.

4.2.1. Recommendation for Nigerian Oppression Remedy
4.2.1.1 Party to Institute an Oppression remedy action

As highlighted in chapter 3, the recent Companies and Allied Matters (Repeal and Reenactment) Bill passed by the Nigerian legislators does not permit an applicant to bring an
oppression action against the affiliate of the corporation in which it is a registered holder
of a security.295 It, however, does permit an applicant to institute a derivative action against
the affiliate of a corporation. Apparently, the failure to extend application of the oppression
remedy to affiliates is an omission and it is recommended that the Nigerian legislators
amend this provision before it is passed into law, so that defendants in an oppression
remedy suit that are subsidiaries or affiliates of the corporation in which the applicant is a
registered holder of security do not use this provision to their advantage and prevent
liability where they have erred. In the event that it is not amended and the Bill is passed
into law, the courts should use their discretion to allow such claims against the affiliates
since there seems to be no reasonable reason why actions in respect of affiliates should not
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be permitted in the case of the oppression remedy just as they are in the case of derivative
actions.
4.2.1.2. Reasonable Expectations Test or Analysis
Another area of the minority shareholders’ regime that needs reform is the uncertainty of
the test for liability under the oppression remedy. It is recommended that the courts adopt
the “reasonable expectations” test adopted by the Canadian courts and provide analysis in
deciding whether the oppression remedy will apply. This will help provide some level of
clarity and certainty.296Where the applicability of this remedy is clear, then all stakeholders
in a corporation understand that certain acts analyzed in accordance with guidelines laid
down will amount to oppression, unfair prejudice or unfair disregard of minority
shareholders’ interests. This would also serve as a precaution to directors and controlling
shareholders who understand that the court will apply the same guidelines and provide the
remedy to the minority shareholders if such acts or omissions occur.

4.3. Policy Implications

Introduction
The previous chapter set out the statutory provisions of the derivative action and oppression
remedy under the Nigerian and Canadian corporate law. The analysis shows that the
statutory provisions of both jurisdictions seem to be very similar with not many significant
differences as highlighted in the tables above. However, this section argues that, in practice,
minority shareholders in Nigeria enjoy less protection perhaps suggesting that there are
other factors other than statutory provisions that really account for the differences in the
protection provided to shareholders in the respective jurisdictions.
Research has shown that there is a strong correlation between investor protections,
dispersed shareholdings, and economic development. 297More importantly, research has
also shown that without adequate enforcement patterns in place, shareholders’ rights in a

296

Re BCE, supra note 236.
Rafael La Porta et al, “Law and Finance” (1998) 106:6 Journal of Political Economy 1113 at 1142.

297

87

corporation may not be effectively protected.298Therefore, this section will also identify the
patterns of enforcement in Nigeria, particularly highlighting enforcement errors, juridical
approaches to statutory interpretation, court procedures and professional norms among
lawyers that could impede effective enforcement.
4.3.1. Corporate Law Theory

The corporate law theory of corporate finance propounds that countries with strong legal
investor protections have more dispersed investments than countries with weak legal
investor protections299or better said, that countries with weaker legal protection, have more
concentrated ownership of equity and fewer minority shareholders in publicly-traded
companies than countries with strong legal protections. 300 The theory then predicts that
countries with strong legal investor protections will likely have significantly larger equity
markets than countries with poor investor protection 301 as more investors, both small and
large, will be convinced to invest bearing in mind that their rights and interests will be
adequately protected especially with respect to the returns of their investments.
Apart from the above logical reasoning and predictions, empirical studies have shown that
countries with strong legal protection do have more dispersed shareholders than countries
with weak investor protections. 302 Research has also shown that countries with much
stronger legal investor protections provide a much better environment in which securities
markets can prosper and grow than countries with weak legal investor protections. 303 For
instance, La Porta et al’s research revealed that common law countries which had the
strongest investor protections also had the highest average ratio of outsider held stock
markets to Gross National Product (“GNP”) compared to civil law countries which had
weak investor protection. 304 Further research has also shown that strong legal protection of
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minority shareholders against expropriation is correlated with a significant increase in
valuable stock markets, more initial public offerings and a reduction in ownership
concentration. 305

In view of the above research results, the corporate legal theory suggests that if the legal
investor protections available under Nigerian law are stronger, small investors may feel
more comfortable to invest in Nigerian companies and hence increase the size of capital
markets in Nigeria, whereas where the legal investor protections are weak, such small
investors may be put off or offer to pay prices so low that companies are discouraged from
issuing at such prices. Alternatively, investors may only decide to invest when they are
able to purchase concentrated ownership of shares in companies that could enable them to
protect their rights and interests, and may as such, influence dispersed investments and
growth of capital markets and the economy.
La Porta et al’s research shows that, to a large extent, there is a strong correlation between
weak investor protections and concentrated ownership of shares. In particular, French civil
code countries, which had the weakest shareholders’ protections, were shown to have
highly concentrated ownership of shares. 306 One author has noted that “concentrated
ownership emerges naturally when investor protection is weak” 307 as the controlling
shareholders may see the need to buy more shares in the company in order to closely
monitor the activities of directors of the company and avoid being expropriated by them.308
However, the level of investor protection and the degree of concentration of share
ownership are not always correlated. The previous chapters of this thesis have highlighted
Canada’s strong minority shareholders’ protection compared to the Nigerian minority
shareholders’ protection. However, most publicly-traded corporations in Canada have
concentrated ownership of shares. 309Most publicly traded corporations in Nigeria are also
305
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held by a controlling shareholder that exercises significant control over the corporation.
Recent statistics show that the average percentage for concentrated ownership of shares of
the largest shareholders in the top 5 publicly-traded companies in Nigeria is 65.58%. 310
Although it has been argued in the previous chapters of this thesis that shareholder
protections are stronger in Canada than in Nigeria, both Nigeria and Canada have
concentrated ownership structures in most of their public corporations.
The question that, therefore, arises is whether the Canadian minority shareholders’
protections are strong enough to trigger dispersed shareholdings in Canadian public
corporations. In fact, the research conducted by La Porta et al shows that the Canadian
corporate law system offers one of the strongest regimes of minority shareholders’
protection and rule of law mechanism among the common law countries examined, and
common law systems were said to have the strongest investor protection rules among all
the legal families. 311 What this seems to suggest is that Canada’s public corporations’
ownership structure challenges the validity of the corporate law theory that provides that
strong investor protections encourages dispersed shareholding in an economy. On the other
hand, the Nigerian experience seems to be consistent with La Porta et al.’s theory since
protection of minority shareholders of Nigerian corporations is weak, and the ownership
of Nigerian top public corporations is highly concentrated.

It is important to note that the corporate law theory is not the exclusive way of explaining
differing corporate ownership structures in various jurisdictions. Other factors may also
come into play that may trigger dispersed shareholdings or concentrated shareholdings, as
the case may be. In fact, it has been argued that concentrated ownership of shares may arise
not as a result of weak legal protections but because acquiring a controlling interest has
been employed as a strategy to yield better monitoring of the management of the
corporation. Concentrated ownership may also help to subsidize the cost of effective
monitoring by offering the block shareholders the practical ability to “engage in forms of
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self-dealing and insider trading that are anathema to market-centered systems of dispersed
ownership”. 312

While it is clear from the above that the corporate legal theory does not explain all observed
patterns in corporate ownership structures, nevertheless it is important to appreciate that
minority shareholder protections play some role in making a jurisdiction attractive to
investors as the research conducted by La Porta et al has shown, especially in a growing
economy like Nigeria. Thus, although it would be an overly simplistic mistake to overstate
the broad economic significance of strong minority shareholder protections, it is still
pertinent to address differences in statutory investor protections, as well as strong
enforcement in place as factors contributing at least to some extent to increased investment
and economic development. Therefore, this thesis has focused on minority shareholders’
protection, acknowledging that this one particular factor is only part of a larger, complex
set of factors affecting capital market developments, but also recognizing that it is equally
important not to overlook this important factor in trying to ensure that there are no areas
impeding investments in the Nigerian economy.

4.3.2. Enforcement as a substitute for weak minority shareholders’ protection
La Porta et al initially advanced the proposition that a strong system of legal enforcement
could substitute for weak legal minority shareholders' rules since an effective judiciary can
step in to provide remedies for minority shareholders where their rights have been
violated.313 However, their study has shown that this prediction is not what occurs in the
corporate world and that legal protection and strong enforcement usually co-exist as
opposed to one being a substitute for the other. To address this point, La Porta et al
examined proxies for the quality of enforcement of minority shareholders’ rights, namely
– measures of “law and order” in different countries compiled by private credit risk
agencies
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jurisdictions.314They examined among other factors the efficiency of the judicial system,
the rule of law and corruption in the various countries. In particular, the aggregate of
common law countries seems to outperform the aggregate of French civil law countries
(which have weak legal protections) on all measures of rule of law. 315 Thus, this research
suggests that enforcement is not a substitute for weak investor protection but that legal
protection for shareholders can only be effective where there are both strong legal
provisions and enforcement by the courts and regulators, as the case may be.
More recent studies have also analyzed the effect of judicial efficiency on a country’s
ability to attract investments, most especially foreign investments. 316It has also been
revealed that most foreign investors structure their international investments based on a
country’s characteristics, with judicial efficiency being one of the foremost. 317 This is
mainly because even where there are well-designed laws, there is a greater need for the
courts to enforce the provisions and protect investors’ rights expeditiously. These studies
make it clear that the two factors - strong legal provisions and judicial enforcement- coexist probably because the courts will usually not provide remedies that are outside of what
is stipulated in the statutes. Thus, just like statutory provisions, the efficiency of the
judiciary and other enforcement institutions are key to improving investment levels in an
economy and perhaps economic development.318
As noted by North:319
Indeed, the difficulty of creating a relatively impartial judicial system that
enforces agreements has been a critical stumbling block in the path of
economic development. In the western world the evolution of courts, legal
systems, and a relatively impartial system of judicial enforcement has played
a major role in permitting the development of a complex system of
314
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contracting that can extend over time and space, an essential requirement for
economic specialization
While it has been argued that adequate minority investor protections can improve
investments which may eventually lead to an improved economy, 320 it is important to note
at this point that adequate minority investor protections do not automatically mean that
there will be improved investments in the economy, nor does a dispersed shareholding
structure such as that associated with publicly-traded corporations in the US and the U.K
equate to higher investment levels or a more developed economy.321 Also, additional or
more adequate minority shareholders’ protections are not a panacea for a nation’s
economic problems. In fact, it can be argued that the improvement of minority
shareholders’ protection is only a small piece of a wide-ranging set of solutions that may
be required in order to generate economic development in a complex system. However,
earlier research conducted by LaPorta et al has shown that there is a strong correlation
between strong legal provisions and enforcement and investment levels and economic
development. Roe, a strong political theorist, admits the importance of legal provisions in
economic development:
I have not denied the value of strong corporate law that protects distant
stockholders nor denigrated its usefulness in building efficacious business
enterprises, nor refuted its academic utility in explaining some key aspects of
corporate differences around the world, especially in transition and third
world nations. 322
4.3.3. Practical Enforcement Obstacles
As highlighted above, there are a few significant differences in the Canadian and Nigerian
statutory provisions relating to the derivative action and oppression remedy. However,
most of the statutory provisions are somewhat similar especially because of the initial
sources of both corporate laws – English law. The question that arises is what makes the
Canadian minority shareholders’ protection different from what is obtainable under
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Nigerian minority shareholders’ protection. The answer appears to be enforcement patterns
in Nigeria. These enforcement patterns reflect the attitudes and approaches that the courts
adopt in interpreting the provisions of the statutes, the delays in delivering judgments, and
different court procedures, to mention a few.

For instance, the Nigerian courts have continued to adopt a common law approach in
interpreting the provisions of CAMA relating to the derivative action and oppression
remedy provisions. As highlighted in chapter 2 of this thesis, the Nigerian courts will
usually dismiss any application not brought under the required mode set out in the
Companies Proceeding Rules even though the application shows proof of the conditions to
be satisfied. The Canadian courts, on the other hand, have expressly pronounced in
accordance with the rules of civil procedure that the court will not set an application aside
simply because it was instituted in the wrong procedural mode. The Canadian courts have
also emphasized that although it partly originated from English common law, the current
Canadian law no longer reflects the attitude underlying the old common law rule. 323No
doubt, textual differences in the Canadian legislative provision also aid the Canadian courts
in making such flexible pronouncements. Nevertheless, the Nigerian courts could apply
their discretion and adopt a more flexible approach pending legislative amendment in order
to simplify the procedure for minority shareholders who want to apply for a derivative
action on behalf of the corporation.

With respect to the oppression remedy, even though the Canadian and Nigerian oppression
remedy provisions are very similar, the Canadian courts have provided a broader
interpretation to cover “reasonable expectations” of parties even where such expectations
are not set out in legal documents. Nigerian courts have yet to establish any guidelines for
exercising their judicial discretion of the sort that have evolved under the Canadian
corporate legal system. The Nigerian courts examine the facts of each case and simply go
straight to pronouncing whether or not the oppression remedy will apply without providing
any form of guidelines or analysis that can create some level of certainty in the Nigerian
minority shareholders’ protection regime.
323
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Apart from the manner in which the Nigerian courts interpret the statutory scope of the
derivative action and oppression remedy, there is also the issue of the effectiveness of the
judiciary in adequately enforcing the provisions of CAMA. Just as highlighted by La Porta
et al, the importance of an effective judiciary cannot be overemphasized in adequately
protecting shareholders. In other words, apart from ensuring that the Nigerian statutory
investor protections are strong, there is need for an effective judiciary in place to enforce
the statutory provisions. However, the effectiveness of the judicial system has been
questioned in recent times especially in light of the delay in judicial proceedings caused by
unnecessary adjournments orchestrated by the lawyers and even judges. In some instances,
the judges are overburdened with cases they are required to hear weekly, thereby making
them cancel on some when they feel overstretched. This is because the registrar may have
fixed too many cases on a particular day without informing the judge simply because the
registrar cannot turn down applications of lawyers who will prefer a particular date, which
will not be convenient for the court. 324 The lawyers also sometimes pressure these registrars
or even offer bribes in order to get a certain date which may not be convenient for the court.
Consequently, the judges have no option other than to adjourn when there are too many
cases to be heard on a day that is inconvenient for the court. In some other instances, the
delay is caused primarily by the legal practitioner who may be purposely requesting for
adjournments where he is unprepared or believes his case is not likely to come out
positively. In such cases, he may feel the need to keep requesting for such adjournments.
If granted by the courts, these adjournments may frustrate the other party and perhaps even
lead the other party to drop the matter. 325Even though this is against the Nigerian rules of
professional conduct for lawyers, many legal practitioners have continued these practices
thereby causing unnecessary delays in proceedings, probably because there are not obvious
consequences for these actions.
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In Nigeria, statistics have shown that the average period to begin and conclude litigation is
about six to ten years. 326Recent statistics also show that in the beginning of the 2018/2019
legal year, 191,766 cases were still pending at the Federal High Court (the court bestowed
with the jurisdiction to handle company-related matters) 327across its various divisions in
Nigeria.328These statistics could be very discouraging to a minority shareholder who is
seeking a remedy as such shareholder may have fears of spending several years in court
while also incurring significant legal costs. At the margins, prospective investors
conducting due diligence on the Nigerian legal system before investing may be put off by
the estimated timeline for obtaining a remedy in the event that a breach has occurred.
Conversely, if litigation processes were known to be timely and efficient, the threat of
effective enforcement of minority shareholders’ rights could deter corporate management
and other stakeholders from abusing minority shareholders’ rights, especially where such
parties may predict that the court will speedily protect the minority shareholders’ rights.329

Generally, many have argued that perhaps relying more on regulators to settle investmentrelated disputes will make the legal system more effective especially because some judges
do not understand the issues revolving around law and investments. 330Regulators, on the
other hand, tend to be more knowledgeable about securities and investments generally and
understand the impact these sectors have on the Nigerian economy and as such understand
the urgency required in resolving investment disputes. However, under Nigerian law these
regulators such as the Commission and the Investment Securities Tribunal only have
limited jurisdictions over certain investment disputes, 331 leaving most of the enforcement
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of minority shareholders protections available under CAMA to the courts. Therefore, it is
important that the Nigerian government seeks to ensure that courts speedily apply the
statutory provisions where investors’ rights and interests have been violated.

Even though the legislative provisions relating to the derivative action and oppression
remedy under the CBCA and CAMA are very similar, the above factors may be responsible
for the different outcomes in the protection of minority shareholders under the respective
jurisdictions in addition to the difference in their statutory provisions. Other factors may
also be responsible for the difference in their outcomes. However, it is the hope that the
courts would consider granting adjournments sparingly especially where such
adjournments are simply used as a delay-tactic by the defendants in an investor-related
dispute. Furthermore, it is important that policymakers make conscious efforts to reduce
the delays in the attainment of the minority shareholders’ remedies by setting specific
timelines within which the courts should decide investor remedy related cases. The fact
that a simple derivative action case today could last between 2-3 years before being
disposed does not speak well of the Nigerian legal system and makes a mockery of the
government’s commitment to ensure increase of investments in the Nigerian economy.

Conclusion

This chapter highlights the differences in the legislative provisions and interpretation of
the courts of the derivative action and oppression remedy under the CBCA and CAMA. It
reveals that there are not many significant statutory differences between the provisions in
each jurisdiction but the difference in protection of minority shareholders appears to lie in
the judicial approaches to statutory interpretation and patterns of enforcement. It also
briefly highlights the connection between corporate law and enforcement and ownership
structures in corporations and economic development, while also acknowledging that there
are other factors that may significantly trigger dispersed investments and economic
development. As Roe rightly noted, there can be more than one theory that explains the
variation in corporate structures. Therefore, it is important that the various pitfalls available
under each theory be addressed in order to ensure that economic growth is facilitated from
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all angles. The focus in this thesis is upon inadequacies typically under corporate law
statutory provisions and in enforcement patterns.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
The purpose of this research was to examine the minority shareholders' protection available
under the Canadian and Nigerian corporate legal systems, focusing specifically on
the derivative action and oppression remedy. The reason for this, as highlighted in chapter
3 of this thesis, is that the derivative action and oppression remedy are the two most
important remedies currently available under corporate law, with the latter being described
by a Canadian author as “the broadest, most comprehensive and most open-ended remedy
in the common-law world”.332 The derivative action, which is a remedy obtained for
wrongs done to a corporation is also a vital tool used in protecting minority shareholders
because a wrong done to a corporation may consequently affect shareholders’ rights and
interests. In assessing these remedies, the primary sources of law considered in the two
jurisdictions were statutes namely, CAMA, which is applicable to all companies
incorporated in Nigeria, and the CBCA, applicable only to federally incorporated business
organizations in Canada. Apart from these statutes, another key source of law examined
in this thesis was case law from Nigeria and Canada and some historically relevant English
law cases.

This thesis highlights, in a comparative style, how Canadian and Nigerian corporate laws
protect minority shareholders’ corporate and personal rights and how the courts in their
respective jurisdictions interpret and implement these statutory provisions. The objective
is to re-emphasize the importance of having a strong mechanism in place such that when
corporate-related issues and disputes arise, minority shareholders who are investors are not
left without adequate remedy. This research further highlights the differences in the
legislative provisions and interpretation of the courts of the derivative action and
oppression remedy under the CBCA and CAMA. It reveals that there are not many
significant differences between the statutory provisions in the two jurisdictions but
important differences appear to lie in the judicial approaches to statutory interpretation and
patterns of enforcement. It also emphasizes the importance of not only strong statutory
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provisions but also adequate implementation of those provisions. For the government, it is
important that these laws adequately protect both local and foreign investors so as to
encourage prospective investors or current investors to invest more which may in turn
increase investment levels in the economy.

This thesis presents to prospective investors, legal personnel, and government agencies
responsible for policymaking in both jurisdictions a clear picture of the fundamental
protections available to shareholders, particularly minority shareholders in the corporation.
It further reveals the attitudes of the courts in the respective jurisdictions in interpreting
statutory provisions protecting the rights and interests of the minority shareholders.
While it has been argued that the legal factors affecting shareholders’ rights are not all that
is required to increase investments and that they are perhaps only a small piece of a wide
range of factors necessary for increase in investments, it is well settled that there is some
connection between the level of investment and minority shareholder protections.333This
thesis not only provided a comparison of the derivative action and oppression remedy under
Nigerian and Canadian corporate law, which will be of great assistance to the legislators,
but also highlighted the significance of strong statutory provisions and enforcement in
order to encourage investments. This is a crucial point for the future development of the
Nigerian economy, but more importantly it is also an opportunity for Nigeria’s legislators
to act fast and review the archaic Nigerian corporate legal provisions and for Nigerian
courts to adopt the approach taken by the Canadian courts in interpreting the derivative
action and oppression remedy. It is further suggested that this research be used as a
foundation for further research in the field of corporate minority shareholder remedies as
well as for enforcement reforms, especially in Nigeria where the Nigerian government is
currently reviewing legislation and developing mechanisms that can stimulate a significant
economic reform. It is hoped that this thesis will help to advance this journey.
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